Victor Chernov in 1914

Victor Chernov in 1914

We are searching data for your request:

Forums and discussions:
Manuals and reference books:
Data from registers:
Wait the end of the search in all databases.
Upon completion, a link will appear to access the found materials.

Victor Chernov was born in Novouzensk, Russia, in 1873. He studied law at Moscow University where he quickly became leader of the illegal students union.

A follower of Paul Lavrov, Chernov was arrested and imprisoned in the Peter-Paul Fortress in St. Petersburg. Exiled to Tambov, Chernov began establishing independent socialist peasant brotherhoods in the area.

In 1899 Chernov went to live in Switzerland where he studied philosophy at Berne University. He returned in 1901 and joined with Catherine Breshkovskaya, Nikolai Avksentiev, Gregory Gershuni, Alexander Kerensky and Evno Azef to establish the Socialist Revolutionary Party.

Chernov edited the SR journal, Revolutionary Russia, where he argued against Marxists who claimed that the peasants were a totally reactionary social class.

After living in exile Chernov returned to Russia during the 1905 Revolution. Although seen as the leader of the party, Chernov was not directly involved in the rising in support of the Potemkin Mutiny and the St Petersburg Soviet.

1. Was highly critical of Nicholas II and the autocracy.

2. Wanted Russia to have universal suffrage.

3. Wanted the Russian government to allow freedom of expression and an end to political censorship of newspapers and books.

4. Believed that democracy could only be achieved in Russia by the violent overthrow of Nicholas II and the autocracy.

5. Was strongly opposed to Russia going to war with Austria-Hungary and Germany.

6. Believed that if Russia did go to war with Austria-Hungary and Germany the Mensheviks, Bolsheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries should try to persuade the Russian soldiers to use their weapons to overthrow Nicholas II.

Viktor Mikhaylovich Chernov

Our editors will review what you’ve submitted and determine whether to revise the article.

Viktor Mikhaylovich Chernov, also called Boris Olenin, (born November 19 [December 1, New Style], 1873, Kamyshin, Russia—died April 15, 1952, New York, N.Y., U.S.), a founder of the Russian Social Revolutionary Party in 1902, who spent much of his life in exile but was briefly a minister in provisional governments in Russia (May 5–Sept. 1, 1917).

A revolutionist from 1893, Chernov became a member of his party’s central committee, wrote the party’s platform, and edited Revolyutsionnaya Rossiya (“Revolutionary Russia”). In exile in western Europe when World War I broke out, Chernov attended the Zimmerwald Conference of 1915 (a meeting convened by Italian and Swiss Socialists to press for immediate cessation of World War I) and supported the “defeatist” resolution of his party’s left wing, which condemned the “imperialist war.” But after he returned to Russia following the February Revolution (1917) and became minister of agriculture, he advocated defending his country against the Germans.

During 1917 Chernov edited Delo Naroda (“Cause of the People”) and opposed the left wing of his party and the Bolsheviks. He became popular as leader of the party representing the peasants’ interests and was elected president of the constituent assembly that opened in Petrograd (now St. Petersburg) on Jan. 18, 1918, and was dispersed the next day by the Bolsheviks. After a brief association with the Socialist Revolutionary government established at Samara to oppose the Bolsheviks, he emigrated in 1920, wrote and lived in Paris until the outbreak of World War II, and then went to the United States, where he contributed to anticommunist periodicals.

Maine Memory Network

The Victor Victrola VV VIII was a table top model that had a ten-inch turntable, a spring powered motor and an oak cabinet. Manufactured from 1911 to 1924, it was a less popular than the VV IX because of its less sturdy construction.

About This Item

  • Title: Victor Victrola, 1914
  • Creator: Victor Talking Machine Company
  • Creation Date: 1914
  • Subject Date: 1914
  • Town: Littleton
  • County: Aroostook
  • State: ME
  • Media: Wood, metal
  • Dimensions: 63 cm x 36 cm x 49 cm
  • Object Type: Physical Object

Cross Reference Searches

Standardized Subject Headings

Other Keywords

For more information about this item, contact:

The copyright and related rights status of this item have not been evaluated. Please contact the contributing repository for more information.

Please post your comment below to share with others. If you'd like to privately share a comment or correction with MMN staff, please use this form.


Origins Edit

The origin of the Victor and the other V bombers is heavily linked with the early British atomic weapons programme and nuclear deterrent policies that developed in the aftermath of the Second World War. The atom bomb programme formally began with Air Staff Operational Requirement OR.1001 issued in August 1946, which anticipated a government decision in January 1947 to authorise research and development work on atomic weapons, the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (McMahon Act) having prohibited exporting atomic knowledge, even to countries that had collaborated on the Manhattan Project. [1] OR.1001 envisaged a weapon not to exceed 24 ft 2 in (7.37 m) in length, 5 ft (1.5 m) in diameter, 10,000 lb (4,500 kg) in weight, and suitable for release from 20,000 ft (6,100 m) to 50,000 ft (15,000 m). [2]

At the same time, the Air Ministry drew up requirements for bombers to replace the existing piston-engined heavy bombers such as the Avro Lancaster and the new Avro Lincoln which equipped RAF Bomber Command. [N 1] In January 1947, the Ministry of Supply distributed Specification B.35/46 to aviation companies to satisfy Air Staff Operational Requirement OR.229 for "a medium range bomber landplane capable of carrying one 10,000 lb (4,500 kg) bomb to a target 1,500 nautical miles (1,700 mi 2,800 km) from a base which may be anywhere in the world." A cruising speed of 500 knots (580 mph 930 km/h) at heights between 35,000 ft (11,000 m) and 50,000 ft (15,000 m) was specified. The maximum weight when fully loaded ought not to exceed 100,000 lb (45,000 kg). The weapons load was to include a 10,000 lb (4,500 kg) "Special gravity bomb" (i.e. a free-fall nuclear weapon), or over shorter ranges 20,000 lb (9,100 kg) of conventional bombs. No defensive weapons were to be carried, the aircraft relying on its speed and altitude to avoid opposing fighters. [4]

The similar OR.230 required a "long range bomber" with a 2,000 nautical miles (2,300 mi 3,700 km) radius of action at a height of 50,000 ft (15,000 m), a cruise speed of 575 mph (925 km/h), and a maximum weight of 200,000 lb (91,000 kg) when fully loaded. [5] Responses to OR.230 were received from Short Brothers, Bristol, and Handley Page however, the Air Ministry recognised that developing an aircraft to meet these stringent requirements would have been technically demanding and so expensive that the resulting bomber could be purchased only in small numbers. [6] As a result, realising that the majority of likely targets would not require such a long range, a less demanding specification for a medium-range bomber, Air Ministry Specification B.35/46 was issued. This demanded the ability to carry the same 10,000 lb bomb-load to a target 1,500 nautical miles (1,700 mi 2,800 km) away at a height of 45,000–50,000 ft (14,000–15,000 m) at a speed of 575 mph (925 km/h). [4]

HP.80 Edit

The design proposed by Handley Page in response to B.35/46 was given the internal designation of HP.80. To achieve the required performance, Handley Page's aerodynamicist Dr. Gustav Lachmann and his deputy, Godfrey Lee developed a crescent-shaped swept wing for the HP.80. [7] Aviation author Bill Gunston described the Victor's compound-sweep crescent wing as having been "undoubtedly the most efficient high-subsonic wing on any drawing board in 1947". [8] The sweep and chord of the wing decreased in three distinct steps from the root to the tip, to ensure a constant critical Mach number across the entire wing and consequently a high cruise speed. [9] The other parts of the aircraft which accelerate the flow, the nose and tail, were also designed for the same critical mach number so the shape of the HP.80 had a constant critical mach number all over. [8] Early work on the project included tailless aircraft designs, which would have used wing-tip vertical surfaces instead however as the proposal matured, a high-mounted, full tailplane was adopted instead. [10] The profile and shaping of the crescent wing was subject to considerable fine-tuning and alterations throughout the early development stages, particularly to counter unfavourable pitching behaviour in flight. [11]

The HP.80 and Avro's Type 698 were chosen as the best two of the proposed designs to B.35/46, and orders for two prototypes of each were placed. [12] It was recognised, however, that there were many unknowns associated with both designs, and an order was also placed for Vickers' design, which became the Valiant. Although not fully meeting the requirements of the specification, the Valiant design posed little risk of failure and could therefore reach service earlier. [13] The HP.80's crescent wing was tested on a ⅓-scale glider, the HP.87, and a heavily modified Supermarine Attacker, which was given the Handley Page HP.88 designation. The HP.88 crashed on 26 August 1951 after completing only about thirty flights and little useful data was gained during its brief two months of existence. By the time the HP.88 was ready, the HP.80 wing had changed such that the former was no longer representative. The design of the HP.80 had sufficiently advanced that the loss of the HP.88 had little effect on the programme. [14]

Two HP.80 prototypes, WB771 and WB775, were built. WB771 was broken down at the Handley Page factory at Radlett and transported by road to RAF Boscombe Down for its first flight bulldozers were used to clear the route and create paths around obstacles. Sections of the aircraft were hidden under wooden framing and tarpaulins printed with "GELEYPANDHY / SOUTHAMPTON" to make it appear as a boat hull in transit. GELEYPANDHY was an anagram of "Handley Pyge", marred by a signwriter's error. [15] On 24 December 1952, piloted by Handley Page's chief test pilot Hedley Hazelden, WB771 made its maiden flight, which lasted for a total of 17 minutes. [16] [17] Ten days later, the Air Ministry announced the aircraft's official name to be Victor. [18] [N 2]

The prototypes performed well however, design failings led to the loss of WB771 on 14 July 1954, when the tailplane detached whilst making a low-level pass over the runway at Cranfield, causing the aircraft to crash with the loss of the crew. Attached to the fin using three bolts, the tailplane was subjected to considerably more load than had been anticipated, causing fatigue cracking around the bolt holes. This led to the bolts loosening and failing in shear. Stress concentrations around the holes were reduced by adding a fourth bolt. [19] The potential for flutter due to shortcomings in the design of the fin/tailplane joint was also reduced by shortening the fin. [20] [21] Additionally, the prototypes were tail heavy due to the lack of equipment in the nose this was remedied by adding large ballast weights to the prototypes. [22] Production Victors had a lengthened nose to move the crew escape door further from the engine intakes as the original position was considered too dangerous as an emergency exit in flight. The lengthened nose also improved the center of gravity range. [23]

Victor B.1 Edit

Production B.1 Victors were powered by the Armstrong Siddeley Sapphire ASSa.7 turbojets rated at 11,000 lbf (49 kN), and was initially deployed with the Blue Danube nuclear weapon, re-deploying with the more powerful Yellow Sun weapon when it became available. Victors also carried U.S.-owned Mark 5 nuclear bombs (made available under the Project E programme) and the British Red Beard tactical nuclear weapon. [24] [25] [26] A total of 24 were upgraded to B.1A standard by the addition of Red Steer tail warning radar in an enlarged tail-cone and a suite of radar warning receivers and electronic countermeasures (ECM) from 1958 to 1960. [27] [28]

On 1 June 1956, a production Victor XA917 flown by test pilot Johnny Allam inadvertently exceeded the speed of sound after Allam let the nose drop slightly at a high power setting. Allam noticed a cockpit indication of Mach 1.1 and ground observers from Watford to Banbury reported hearing a sonic boom. The Victor maintained stability throughout the event. Aviation author Andrew Brookes has claimed that Allam broke the sound barrier knowingly to demonstrate the Victor's superiority to the earlier V-bombers. [29] [N 3] The Victor was the largest aircraft to have broken the sound barrier at that time. [30]

Victor B.2 Edit

The RAF required a higher ceiling for its bombers, and a number of proposals were considered for improved Victors to meet this demand. At first, Handley Page proposed use of the 14,000 lbf (62 kN) Sapphire 9 engines to produce a "Phase 2" bomber, to be followed by "Phase 3" Victors with much greater wingspan at 137 ft (42 m) and powered by Bristol Siddeley Olympus turbojets or Rolls-Royce Conway turbofans. The Sapphire 9 was cancelled, however, and the heavily modified Phase 3 aircraft would have delayed production, so an interim "Phase 2A" Victor was proposed and accepted, to be powered by the Conway and having minimal modifications. [31] [32]

The "Phase 2A" proposal was accepted by the Air Staff as the Victor B.2, with Conway RCo.11 engines providing 17,250 lbf (76.7 kN). The new Conway engines required redesigned enlarged intakes to provide the greater airflow required. The wingtips were extended, increasing the wingspan to 120 ft (37 m). [33] The B.2 featured distinctive retractable "elephant ear" intakes not found on the B.1, located on the rear fuselage forward of the tail fin. These scoops fed ram air to Ram Air Turbines (RAT) which could provide electrical power during emergency situations, such as engine failure, during flight. [34] [35]

The first prototype Victor B.2, serial number XH668 made its maiden flight on 20 February 1959. [36] It had flown 100 hours by 20 August 1959, when, while high-altitude engine tests were being carried out by the Aeroplane and Armament Experimental Establishment (A&AEE), it disappeared from radar screens, crashing into the sea off the coast of Pembrokeshire. An extensive search operation was initiated to locate and salvage the wreckage of XH668 to determine the cause of the crash. It took until November 1960 to recover most of the aircraft the accident investigation concluded that the starboard pitot head had failed inflight, causing the flight control system to force the aircraft into an unrecoverable dive. [37] Only minor changes were needed to resolve this problem, [38] allowing the Victor B.2 to enter service in February 1962. [39]

Further development Edit

A total of 21 B.2 aircraft were upgraded to the B.2R standard with Conway RCo.17 engines (20,600 lbf or 92 kN thrust) and facilities to carry a Blue Steel stand-off nuclear missile. [40] Their wings were modified to incorporate two "speed pods" or "Küchemann carrots". These were anti-shock bodies bulged fairings that reduced wave drag at transonic speeds (see area rule), which were also used as a convenient place to house chaff dispensers. [41] Handley Page proposed to build a further refined "Phase 6" Victor, with more fuel and capable of carrying up to four Skybolt (AGM-48) ballistic missiles on standing airborne patrols, but this proposal was rejected although it was agreed that some of the Victor B.2s on order would be fitted to carry two Skybolts. This plan was abandoned when the U.S. cancelled the whole Skybolt programme in 1963. [42] With the move to low-level penetration missions, the Victors were fitted with air-to-air refuelling probes above the cockpit and received large underwing fuel tanks. [43]

Nine B.2 aircraft were converted for strategic reconnaissance purposes to replace Valiants which had been withdrawn due to wing fatigue, with delivery beginning in July 1965. [24] These aircraft received a variety of cameras, a bomb bay-mounted radar mapping system and wing top sniffers to detect particles released from nuclear testing. [27] Designated Victor SR.2, a single aircraft could photograph the whole of the United Kingdom in a single two-hour sortie. Different camera configurations could be installed in the bomb bay, including up to four F49 survey cameras and up to eight F96 cameras could be fitted to take vertical or oblique daylight photography nighttime photography required the fitting of F89 cameras. [44]

Aerial refuelling conversion Edit

Prior to the demise of the Valiant tankers, a trial installation of refuelling equipment was carried out, including: overload bomb-bay tanks, underwing tanks, refuelling probe and jettisonable de Havilland Spectre Assisted Take-Off units. The aircraft involved in the trials, B.1 "XA930", carried out successful trials at Boscombe Down at very high all-up weights with relatively short field length take-offs. [45]

The withdrawal of the Valiant fleet because of metal fatigue in December 1964 meant that the RAF had no front line tanker aircraft, so the B.1/1A aircraft, now judged to be surplus in the strategic bomber role, were refitted for this duty. To get some tankers into service as quickly as possible, six B.1A aircraft were converted to B(K).1A standard (later redesignated B.1A (K2P) [46] ), receiving a two-point system with a hose and drogue carried under each wing, while the bomb bay remained available for weapons. Handley Page worked day and night to convert these six aircraft, with the first being delivered on 28 April 1965, and 55 Squadron becoming operational in the tanker role in August 1965. [47]

While these six aircraft provided a limited tanker capability suitable for refuelling fighters, the Mk 20A wing hosereels could only deliver fuel at a limited rate, and were not suitable for refuelling bombers. Work therefore continued to produce a definitive three-point tanker conversion of the Victor Mk.1. Fourteen further B.1A and 11 B.1 were fitted with two permanently fitted fuel tanks in the bomb bay, and a high-capacity Mk 17 centreline hose dispenser unit with three times the fuel flow rate as the wing reels, and were designated K.1A and K.1 respectively. [47]

The remaining B.2 aircraft were not as suited to the low-level mission profile that the RAF had adopted for carrying out strategic bombing missions as the Vulcan with its strong delta wing. [48] This, combined with the switch of the nuclear deterrent from the RAF to the Royal Navy (with the Polaris missile) meant that the Victors were considered to be surplus to requirements. [27] Hence, 24 B.2 were modified to K.2 standard. Similar to the K.1/1A conversions, the wing was trimmed to reduce stress and the bomb aimer's nose glazing was plated over. During 1982, the glazing was reintroduced on some aircraft, the former nose bomb aimer's position having been used to mount F95 cameras in order to perform reconnaissance missions during the Falklands War. [49] The K.2 could carry 91,000 lb (41,000 kg) of fuel. It served in the tanker role until withdrawn in October 1993. [27]

Overview Edit

The Victor was a futuristic-looking, streamlined aircraft, with four turbojet (later turbofan) engines buried in the thick wing roots. Distinguishing features of the Victor were its highly swept T-tail with considerable dihedral on the tail planes, and a prominent chin bulge that contained the targeting radar, nose landing gear unit and an auxiliary bomb aimer's position. [50] It was originally required by the specification that the whole nose section could be detached at high altitudes to act as an escape pod, but the Air Ministry abandoned this requirement in 1950. [51] [52]

The Victor had a five-man crew, comprising the two pilots seated side by side and three rearward-facing crew, these being the navigator/plotter, the navigator/radar operator, and the air electronics officer (AEO). [53] Unlike the Vulcan and Valiant, the Victor's pilots sat at the same level as the rest of the crew, due to a larger pressurised compartment that extended all the way to the nose. [50] As with the other V-bombers, only the pilots were provided with ejection seats the three systems operators relying on "explosive cushions" inflated by a CO2 bottle that would help them from their seats and towards a traditional bail out in the event of high g-loading, but despite this, escape for the three backseaters was extremely difficult. [54] [55] [N 4]

While assigned to the nuclear delivery role, the Victor was finished in an all-over anti-flash white colour scheme, designed to protect the aircraft against the damaging effects of a nuclear detonation. The white colour scheme was intended to reflect heat away from the aircraft paler variations of RAF's roundels were also applied for this same reason. When the V-bombers were assigned to the low-level approach profile in the 1960s, the Victors were soon repainted in green/grey tactical camouflage to reduce visibility to ground observation the same scheme was applied to subsequently converted tanker aircraft. [57]

Armaments and equipment Edit

The Victor's bomb bay was much larger than that of the Valiant and Vulcan, which allowed heavier weapon loads to be carried at the cost of range. As an alternative to the single "10,000 lb" nuclear bomb as required by the specification, the bomb bay was designed to carry several conventional armaments, including a single 22,000 lb (10,000 kg) Grand Slam or two 12,000 lb (5,400 kg) Tallboy earthquake bombs, up to forty-eight 1,000 lb (450 kg) bombs [N 5] or thirty-nine 2,000 lb (910 kg) sea mines. One proposed addition to the Victor were underwing panniers capable of carrying a further 28 1,000 lb bombs to supplement the main bomb bay, but this option was not pursued. [58]

In addition to a range of free-fall nuclear bombs, later Victor B.2s operated as missile carriers for standoff nuclear missiles such as Blue Steel it had been intended for the American Skybolt missile to be introduced however, development of Skybolt was cancelled. [59] Target information for Blue Steel could be input during flight, as well in advance of the mission. It was reported that, with intensive work, a B.2 missile carrier could revert to carrying free-fall nuclear weapons or conventional munitions within 30 hours. [60]

Like the other two V-Bombers, the Victor made use of the Navigational and Bombing System (NBS) a little-used optical sight had also been installed upon early aircraft. [61] For navigation and bomb-aiming purposes, the Victor employed several radar systems. These included the H2S radar, developed from the first airborne ground-scanning radar, and the Green Satin radar. [62] Radar information was inputted into the onboard electromechanical analogue bomb-aiming apparatus. Some of the navigation and targeting equipment was either directly descended from, or shared concepts with, those used on Handley Page's preceding Halifax bomber. Operationally, the accuracy of the bomb-aiming system proved to be limited to roughly 400 yards, which was deemed sufficient for high-level nuclear strike operations. [63]

Avionics and systems Edit

The Victor had fully powered flying controls, i.e. ailerons, elevators and rudder, with no manual reversion which, therefore, required a back-up system, i.e. duplication. Since they were fully powered an artificial feel unit was needed, fed by ram air from the pitot in the nose. The control system was duplicated in flying control units which received pilot and autopilot demands. Pilot control movements were transmitted via a low-friction mechanical system to the flying control units. Duplication was provided on the premise that the single pilots input would remain functional and that neither hydraulic motors nor screwjack on a unit would jam. A separate hydraulic circuit was used for each of the following: landing gear, flaps, nose flaps, air brakes, bomb doors, wheel brakes, nose-wheel steering, ram-air-turbine air scoops. [35] An AC electrical system and auxiliary power unit were significant additions to the later Victor B.2, electrical reliability being noticeably improved. [64] [N 6]

To evade enemy detection and interception efforts, the Victor was outfitted with an extensive ECM suite which were operated by the air electronics officer (AEO), who had primary responsibility for the aircraft's electronics and communication systems. The ECM equipment could be employed to disrupt effective use of both active and passive radar in the vicinity of the aircraft, and to provide situational awareness for the crew. Enemy communications could also be jammed, and radar guided missiles of the era were also reportedly rendered ineffective. [66] The Victor B.2 featured an extended area located around the base of the tail fin which contained cooling systems and some of the ECM equipment. [67]

Some of the ECM equipment which initially saw use on the Victor, such as the original chaff dispenser and Orange Putter tail warning radar, had been developed for the earlier English Electric Canberra bomber and were already considered to be near-obsolete by the time the Victor had entered service. [68] Significant improvements and alterations would be made to the avionics and ECM suites, as effective ECMs had been deemed critical to the Victor's role for example, the introduction of the more capable Red Steer tail warning radar. [69] The introduction of the Victor B.2 was accompanied by several new ECM systems, including a passive radar warning receiver, a metric radar jammer and communications jamming equipment. Streamlined fairings on the trailing edges of the wings that could house large quantities of defensive chaff/flares were also new additions. [70] While trials were conducted with terrain-following radar and a side scan mode for the bombing and navigation radar, neither of these functions were integrated into the operational fleet. [27]

Engines Edit

The Victor B.1 was powered by four Armstrong Siddeley Sapphire turbojet engines. The engines were embedded in pairs in the wing roots. Because of the high mounted position of the wing, the tail had to adopt a high mounting to maintain clearance of the jet turbulence, but the airbrakes were ideally situated to take advantage of this phenomenon. [71] Difficulties were encountered with the Sapphires when stationed in tropical environments as several engines were destroyed by the turbine blades striking the outer engine casing, which could occur when flying through dense cloud or heavy rain. [61] [72] The Victor B.2 was powered by the newer Rolls-Royce Conway turbofan which at one point was the most powerful non-afterburning engine outside of the Soviet Union. The Conway had significantly higher thrust than the Sapphire engine in the B.1. [73]

The Victor B.2 featured a distinct change in the aircraft's engine arrangements incorporated into the right wing root was a Blackburn Artouste airborne auxiliary power unit (AAPU), effectively a small fifth engine. The AAPU was capable of providing high-pressure air for starting the main engines, and also providing electrical power on the ground or alternatively in the air as an emergency back-up in the event of main engine failures. The AAPU also acted to reduce the need for external specialist support equipment. Turbine-driven alternators, otherwise known as ram air turbines (RATs), had been introduced on the B.2 to provide emergency power in the event of electrical or hydraulic power being lost. Retractable scoops in the rear fuselage would open to feed ram air into the RATs, which would provide sufficient electrical power to operate the flight controls. In the event of engine flameout RATs would assist the crew in maintaining control of the aircraft until the main engines could be relit. [34] [35]

Flight profile Edit

The Victor was commonly described as having good handling and excellent performance, along with favourable low speed flight characteristics. [74] During the flight tests of the first prototype, the Victor proved its aerodynamic performance, flying up to Mach 0.98 without handling or buffeting problems there were next to no aerodynamic changes between prototype and production aircraft. [75] [N 7] Production aircraft featured an automated nose-flap operation to counteract a tendency for the aircraft to pitch upwards during low-to-moderate Mach numbers. [77] At low altitude, the Victor typically flew in a smooth and comfortable manner, in part due to its narrowness and flexibility of the crescent wing. [78] One unusual flight characteristic of the early Victor was its self-landing capability once lined up with the runway, the aircraft would naturally flare as the wing entered into ground effect while the tail continued to sink, giving a cushioned landing without any command or intervention by the pilot. [28] [79]

The Victor has been described as an agile aircraft, atypical for a large bomber aircraft in 1958, a Victor had performed several loops and a barrel roll during practices for a display flight at Farnborough Airshow. [80] [81] Manoeuvrability was greatly enabled by the light controls, quick response of the aircraft, and the design of certain flight surfaces such as the infinitely-variable tail-mounted airbrake. [82] The Victor was designed for flight at high subsonic speeds, although multiple instances have occurred in which the sound barrier was broken. [83] During development of the Victor B.2, the RAF had stressed the concept of tactical manoeuvrability, which led to much effort in development being given to increasing the aircraft's height and range performance. [84]

The Victor was the last of the V bombers to enter service, with deliveries of B.1s to No. 232 Operational Conversion Unit RAF based at RAF Gaydon, Warwickshire taking place in late 1957. [85] The first operational bomber squadron, 10 Squadron, formed at RAF Cottesmore in April 1958, with a second squadron, 15 Squadron, forming before the end of the year. [86] Four Victors, fitted with Yellow Astor reconnaissance radar, together with passive sensors, were used to equip a secretive unit, the Radar Reconnaissance Flight at RAF Wyton. [85] [86] The Victor bomber force continued to build up, with 57 Squadron forming in March 1959 and 55 Squadron in October 1960. [46] [87] At its height, the Victor was simultaneously operating with six squadrons of RAF Bomber Command. [61]

According to the operational doctrine developed by the RAF, in the circumstance of deploying a large-scale nuclear strike, each Victor would have operated entirely independently the crews would conduct their mission without external guidance and be reliant upon the effectiveness of their individual tactics to reach and successfully attack their assigned target thus great emphasis was placed on continuous crew training during peacetime. [88] Developing a sense of a crew unity was considered highly important Victor crews would typically serve together for at least five years, and a similar approach was adopted with ground personnel. [89] In order to maximise the operational lifespan of each aircraft, Victor crews typically flew a single five-hour training mission per week. [90] Each crew member was required to qualify for servicing certificates to independently undertake inspection, refuelling and turnaround operations. [76]

In times of high international tension, the V-bombers would be dispersed and have been maintained at a high state of readiness if the order was given to deploy a nuclear strike, Victors at high readiness would have been airborne in under four minutes from the point the order had been issued. [91] British intelligence had estimated that the Soviets' radar network was capable of detecting the Victor at up to 200 miles away, so to avoid interception, the Victor would follow carefully planned routes to exploit weaknesses in the Soviet detection network. This tactic was employed in conjunction with the Victor's extensive onboard ECM to increase the chances of evasion. [66] Whilst originally the Victor would have maintained high-altitude flight throughout a nuclear strike mission, rapid advances of the Soviet anti-aircraft warfare capabilities (exemplified by the downing of a U-2 from 70,000 ft in 1960) led to this tactic being abandoned: a low-level high-speed approach supported by increasingly sophisticated ECMs was adopted in its place. [92] [93]

The improved Victor B.2 started to be delivered in 1961, with the first B.2 Squadron, 139 Squadron, forming in February 1962, and a second, 100 Squadron, in May 1962. [39] These were the only two bomber squadrons to form on the B.2, as the last 28 Victors on order were cancelled. [24] The prospect of Skybolt ballistic missiles, with which each V-bomber could strike at two separate targets, meant that fewer bombers would be needed, [94] while the government was unhappy with Sir Frederick Handley Page's resistance to their pressure to merge his company with competitors. [95] While Skybolt's development would be terminated, Victor B.2s were retrofitted as carrier aircraft for the Blue Steel standoff nuclear missile. The introduction of standoff weapons and the switch to low-level flight in order to evade radar detection were said to be decisive factors in the successful penetration of enemy territory. [59]

In 1964–1965, a series of detachments of Victor B.1As was deployed to RAF Tengah, Singapore as a deterrent against Indonesia during the Borneo conflict, the detachments fulfilling a strategic deterrent role as part of Far East Air Force, while also giving valuable training in low-level flight and visual bombing. [96] [97] In September 1964, with the confrontation with Indonesia reaching a peak, the detachment of four Victors was prepared for rapid dispersal, with two aircraft loaded with live conventional bombs and held on one-hour readiness, ready to fly operational sorties. However, they were never required to fly combat missions and the high readiness alert finished at the end of the month. [98]

Following the discovery of fatigue cracks, developing due to their low-altitude usage, [95] the B.2R strategic bombers were retired and placed in storage by the end of 1968. The RAF had experienced intense demand on its existing aerial refuelling tanker fleet, and its existing fleet of Victor B.1 tankers that had been converted earlier were due to be retired in the 1970s, so it was decided that the stored Victor B.2Rs would be converted to tankers also. [99] Handley Page prepared a modification scheme that would see the Victors fitted with tip tanks, the structure modified to limit further fatigue cracking in the wings, and ejection seats provided for all six crewmembers. [100] [101] The Ministry of Defence delayed signing the order for conversion of the B2s until after Handley Page went into liquidation. The contract for conversion was instead awarded to Hawker Siddeley, who produced a much simpler conversion than that planned by Handley Page, with the wingspan shortened to reduce wing bending stress and hence extend airframe life. [102]

While the Victor was never permanently based with any units stationed overseas, temporary deployments were frequently conducted, often in a ceremonial capacity or to participate in training exercises and competitions. Victor squadrons were dispatched on several extended deployments to the Far East, and short term deployments to Canada were also conducted for training purposes. [103] At one point during the early 1960s, South Africa showed considerable interest in the acquisition of several bomber-configured Victors in the end, the Victor did not serve with any operator other than the RAF. [104]

Several of the Victor B.2s had been converted for Strategic Reconnaissance missions following the retirement of the Valiant in this capacity. In service, this type was primarily used in surveillance of the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Seas, capable of surveying 400,000 square miles in an eight-hour mission they were also used to sample the fallout from French nuclear tests conducted in the South Pacific. [105] Originally reconnaissance Victors were equipped for visual reconnaissance it was found to be cheaper to assign Canberra light bombers to this duty and the cameras were removed in 1970. Subsequently, radar-based reconnaissance was emphasised in the type's role. [106] The reconnaissance Victors remained in use until 1974 when they followed the standard bombers into the tanker conversion line a handful of modified Avro Vulcans assumed the maritime radar reconnaissance role in their place. [96]

Two of the V-bombers, the Victor and the Vulcan, played a high-profile role during the 1982 Falklands War. In order to cross the distance of the South Atlantic, a single Vulcan required refuelling several times from Victor tankers. A total of three bombing missions were flown against Argentine forces deployed to the Falklands, with approximately 1.1 million gal (5 million L) of fuel consumed in each mission. [107] [108] At the time, these missions held the record for the world's longest-distance bombing raids. [109] The deployment of other assets to the theatre, such as the Hawker Siddeley Nimrod and Lockheed Hercules, required the support of the Victor tanker fleet, which had been temporarily relocated to RAF Ascension Island for the campaign. [110] [111] The Victor also undertook several reconnaissance missions over the South Atlantic. These missions provided valuable intelligence for the retaking of South Georgia by British forces. [112]

Following the invasion of Kuwait by neighbouring Iraq in 1991, a total of eight Victor K.2s were deployed to Bahrain to provide in-flight refuelling support to RAF and other coalition aircraft during the subsequent 1991 Gulf War. [95] [113] RAF strike aircraft such as the Panavia Tornado would frequently make use of the tanker to refuel prior to launching cross-border strikes inside Iraq. Shortly after the Gulf War, the remaining Victor fleet was quickly retired in 1993, at which point it had been the last of the three V-bombers in operational service retiring nine years after the last Vulcan, although the Vulcan had survived longer in its original role as a bomber. [114]

LECTURE 6 POLAND: 1864-1914. (Revised Jan. 2004).

1. Economic development was uneven in the three parts of Poland, with industrialization strongest in Russian Poland, especially textiles, and processed agricultural products in Prussian Poland. Oil was discovered and extracted in Austrian Poland (Galicia)..

2. In all three parts, there was an increase in the numbers of Intelligentsia (educated people, mostly of gentry descent), as well as the emergence of a small middle class of business people, and a working class. The latter was most numerous in Russian Poland.

3. There was organized resistance to Germanisation in Prussian Poland and to Russification in Russian Poland.

4. Only in Austrian Poland, beginning in 1868, did Poles have full freedom of education and cultural development. They also filled most administrative positions. This was resented by the Ukrainians, who formed the majority of the population in East Galicia.

5. All three parts of Poland witnessed the emergence of modern political parties.

6. It is estimated that about 4 million people emigrated to the U.S. from Polish lands in the period 1885-1914 these were ethnic Poles, Jews, Ukrainians, and Belorussians. Ethnic Poles settled mainly in Chicago, Buffalo, and Detroit, also in New York,while the Jews also settled in big cities. This period saw the growth of Polish-American communities known in Polish collectively as "Polonia. They had their own churches, elementary schools and newspapers. In these respects they were similar to other emigre communities such as the Irish, Italians, Greeks, Ukrainians, and others.

I. Developments in the three parts of Poland.

1. Russification, Peasant Emancipation and Industrialization in Russian Poland.

After 1864, education was in Russian, even in elementary schools. Private education in Polish was forbidden, and young men were liable to conscription as ordinary soldiers in the Russian army if they failed to pass Russian High School exams. Likewise, no one could go into the civil service or into universities in the Empire without passing these exams. Warsaw University became a Russian university in 1869. Administration was carried on in Russian, which was also the language of the law courts. All street names had to be in Russian, while other names, e.g. of hotels, were in both languages..
However, Polish newspapers, periodicals and books could be published and theater plays staged, though all were subject to censorship. From the late 1880s to 1914, people who wished to study subjects not taught in Russian schools and universities, such as Polish History and Literature, could study in illegal groups called "Flying Universities" because they moved from place to place to avoid drawing the attention of the Russian authorities. If they could afford it, they studied at one of the two Polish universities in Austrian Poland, in Krakow and Lwow [Lviv].

Peasant emancipation was decreed in Poland by Alexander II in March 1864, though it had been proclaimed by the "Reds" in January 1863, at the beginning of the Uprising. Polish peasants were better off than Russian ones because Polish landowners received less compensation than Russian landowners in Russia proper.
Emancipation released a large labor force for industry. However, in the period 1870-91, there was - as elsewhere in Europe - a large increase in the birthrate. This meant that the number of people, especially landless peasants who worked for wages on the land, increased fourfold. This increase could not be absorbed by the developing heavy industry, while small family farms could not feed many people. Therefore, there were great waves of emigration to western Germany and northern France (coal mines), but especially to America.

Russian Poland already had a well developed textile industry centered in Lodz. After 1860, England allowed the export of textile manufacture machines to Russian Poland. There was also a coal and iron/steel industry, and the railway network was expanded. The total value of industrial production in Russian Poland increased in 1864-85 from 30 to 190 million Russian rubles, and to 228 mln. rubles in 1892. The Russian Empire was the market for some 70% of Polish textile production, but after 1890 tariffs were introduced to protect Russian textile industry, which hurt the economy of Russian Poland.

[from Topolski, History of Poland ].

The number of industrial workers increased between 1864-1890 from 80,000 to 150,000. Most of them worked in the textile industry, but their number also increased coal and steel production. Foreign investment, mostly French, increased after 1892 (Franco-Russian alliance). Banks also developed and a small Polish middle class appeared. However, shopkeepers found stiff competition from the Jews, who dominated retail trade as well as artisan production such as tailoring and shoe making. The Intelligentsia was largely Polish they worked in the lower ranks of the civil service, but also provided many engineers to build railroads in the Empire. Political leaders now came from the Intelligentsia.

The Jewish population of Russian Poland grew to about 10% overall of the population by 1914, but in the cities and towns it often reached 30% or more, for example in Warsaw, while in the eastern market towns it sometimes reached 80%. Most of the Jews were unassimilated Hasidim (Hasidic), that is, strictly Orthodox Jews. They lived in their own compact communities in certain parts of large towns, or predominated in small towns they called "shtetls." However, some assimilated (polonized) Jews appeared in banking, industry, law and medicine.
After 1864, there was an increase of anti-Semitism, though not as strong or violent as in Russia proper. Polish anti-Semitism was largely economic stemming from competition between Polish and Jewish small business. This was aggravated by different religions and languages . (Most Jews spoke Yiddish, based on German, though they knew enough Polish for trade purposes). At the same time, Poles resented most educated Jews' adherence to Russian culture, as well as the influx of russified Jews from Lithuania, called "Litwaks." (Pron. Leetfacks).

2. Germanisation and Resistance in Prussian Poland.

Intensive germanisation began after the establishment of the German Empire (Jan. 1871), with Bismarck's "Kulturkampf" (Cultural War) against the Catholic Church in the Empire, because the Catholic Center Party opposed many of his measures. At the same time, he believed that the Polish upper class (nobles) and the Catholic Church in Prussian Poland would always be anti-German, so he set out to limit the power of the church and germanise the schools. German lay teachers replaced Polish priests in the schools, and German became the language of instruction except for religion. The church was persecuted for refusing to comply with the government regulation that all priests have a high school certificate (roughly equivalent to a B.A. or B.S. today). This requirement was opposed by the church all over the Empire as an infringement on its independence from the state. However, it had special meaning in Poland, where catholicism was part of national identity. Polish priests went into hiding, so many Poles could only hear mass said by Polish priests in secrecy. Therefore, this regulation aroused great anger, strengthening Polish national consciousness vis-a-vis the Germans.

Another German attack on the Poles came on the land. In 1886, the Prussian government established the Colonization Commission. It received heavy government subsidies to buy up land from Poles and bring in German settlers. This measure was a reaction to the great German exodus from Prussian Poland to Berlin and the Ruhr -the industrial heart of Germany - where they could earn more money. This exodus, coupled with the high Polish birthrate and a lower German one was sharply reducing the German population, so Berlin feared loss of control over the territory. However, when a farm was up for sale, the Poles borrowed money from their savings banks - which had such good records that they often succeeded in borrowing from Berlin banks! Thus, most of the land stayed in Polish hands.

Agriculture, based on large estates and sizable peasant farms, developed along with a food processing industry. Indeed, Prussian Poland came to be known as the granary of the Reich (Empire). The development of railway lines and canals was very important for the economy.

German fears of losing Prussian Poland led to the establishment of the "Ostmarkenverein," (Eastern Marches Association) in 1892. Poles called it the H-K-T or "Hakata" (pron.Hahkahtah), because it was headed by three German landowners: Hanneman, Kennemann, and Tiedemann. The Association subsidized German civil servants to make them stay at their posts, and also helped German farmers and landowners. The H-K-T developed a racist ideology, teaching German superiority to the Poles, fostering hatred and contempt of the latter. (The same was true of the attitudes of German-speaking Austrians toward the Czechs and other Slavs of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, e.g. Adolf Hitler).

The most extreme German land measures against the Poles of Prussian Poland were " the exceptional laws " passed at the turn of the century, allowing expropriation of Polish-held land. However, this was used very rarely because it met with strong opposition from German landowners in other parts of the Empire, who saw it as a dangerous precedent that could be used against them.
Another measure often used against Poles was to forbid them, once they bought land, to live in houses allegedly unfit for sanitary or other reasons, or even to build a house on their land without prior approval by local authorities - who generally refused such permits. The most famous case of resistance to this law is known as "Drzymala's (pron. Dzhymahlah's) Caravan" (1904). A Polish peasant farmer, Edward Drzymala, was refused a building permit, so he lived with his family in a circus caravan, and when he was refused permission to do that, they moved to a dugout . They were finally left in peace.

In 1904, the Prussian government made another move against the Poles, this time in the schools. It decreed that religion was now to be taught in German. Children were also beaten for speaking Polish in breaks. These measures led to the school strikes of 1901-07, that were ruthlessly put down, which provoked protests in other parts of Poland as well as in the Western press.

[from Topolski, History of Poland]

All these measures provoked widespread Polish resistance and therefore the spread of national consciousness on all levels of Polish society in Prussian Poland. It is not surprising that the National Democratic Party (Dmowski), which saw Germany as the Poles' enemy no.1 had it largest following in Prussian Poland. (See section on the growth of modern political parties in Lec. Notes 6 b. below).

3. The Poles in Austrian Poland [Galicia].

After Austria's defeat by Prussia in 1866, the Austrian Emperor Francis Joseph (1830-1916, ruled 1848-1916), agreed to the "Compromise" which created Austria-Hungary, giving Hungary self-government and equal status with Austria. (See Lec. Notes 7). He rewarded the Polish nobles of Galicia for their loyalty to him vis-a-vis Prussia by granting them home rule, but without the same status as Hungary. The provincial legislature was located in Lwow (German: Lemberg, Ukr. L'viv, Rus. Lvov),

Polish became the language of education, though students had to learn German as a second language in middle school and high schools. The universities in Cracow and Lwow now became Polish. The Polish Academy of Sciences was founded in 1869, with its seat in Cracow.
Galicia now became the center of Polish culture, allowing for the development of Polish art, literature, theater, as well as university studies. Polish deputies formed a "Polish Circle" in the federal parliament, Vienna, and worked for Polish interests. (Jerzy [Yezhy] Cienciala was the first Polish deputy from Austrian Silesia, 1870). They could do this much more effectively in Vienna than their peers in the federal German parliament in Berlin, and in the Russian "Duma" which began to function in 1906. This was so because the Polish deputies in the Vienna parliament were more numerous than those in the St. Petersburg and Berlin, so they could often obtain concessions in return for their votes.

(A) Poverty and Emigration : poor land, small farms, strip farming (strips owned by one familiy but located in different parts of village land), a high birthrate and lack of heavy industry, all combined to produce a very high rate of emigration in the period 1884-1914, mostly to the U.S.

(B) Ukrainian-Polish tensions: About 60% of the population of East Galicia - east of the San river - was Ukrainian-speaking. Most were peasants of the Uniate or Ukrainian faith, while the Poles were Catholics, landowners, and civil servants. There were, however, also Polish peasant villages interspersed with Ukrainian villages and sometimes villages with a mixed Polish-Ukrainian populations. A Ukrainian middle class and Intelligentsia developed in the period 1868-1914.

East Galicia became the center of Ukrainian nationalism because oppression in the Russian Empire made free cultural development impossible there even printing in Ukrainian was not allowed. The Austrian government, for its part, followed a policy of playing the Ukrainians off against the Poles. It allowed the establishment of a Chair of Ukrainian History at the Polish University in Lwow in 1904, which was held by the great historian Mykhailo Hrushevskyi (1866-1934). His Outline History of Ukraine , (1904) was the first of a ten volume History of Ukraine, which inspired and strengthened Ukrainian national consciousness.

(In March 1917, at the time of the first Russian Revolution, he became the first President of of the Ukrainian "Rada," [National Council], Kiev. He settled in Kiev, Soviet Ukraine, in 1924 and published a 5-volume History of Ukrainian Literature , 1923-26. However, Stalin had him arrested and deported in 1930. He died in Kislovodsk in 1934).

In the years 1890-1914, Ukrainian political leaders aimed at the creation of a Ukrainian Crownland in the Austrian Empire. This led to clashes with the Poles because the Ukrainians claimed all of E.Galicia, as well as Bukovina (then part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire) and part of Bessarabia (then in the Russian Empire), which had Ukrainian- speaking populations. Polish-Ukrainian clashes developed at the University, also in the Galician Diet (Legislature) in Lwow.

[For a brief and succinct historical account of early modern Ukraine, 1560-1914, see Timothy Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations. Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1914, New Haven & London, 2003, pp. 105-132. For more detail on the Ukrainians of former East Galicia, see John-Paul Himka, Religion and Nationality in Western Ukraine, Montreal, 1999].

(C) Galician Jews. The Jewish population of Galicia more than doubled in the period 1857-1890, forming 11% of the total population, but 30-80% of the urban population. Jews worked in money lending (mostly in village taverns), retail commerce and small artisan business. They also owned 16.2% of the land, for in the Austrian Empire they were permitted to own land. The second part of the 19 th century saw the growth of anti-Semitism, mainly on an economic basis. However, we should also note that some educated Jews chose assimilation with Polish rather than German culture.

[On the Jews of Galicia, see Stanislaw Grodziski, "The Jewish Question in Galicia," Polin, vol. 12, Oxford, 1999].

II. The Growth of Modern Political Parties and Programs for the Future.

1. 1864-1887/90. Polish society was traumatized by the failure of the 1863-64 uprising, so the next 20 years or so were characterized by passivity and pessimism. This was reflected in the pessimistic interpretation of Polish history by the Cracow school of historians , who condemned old Poland for its weak government and the uprisings of 1830 and 1863 for being romantic/unrealistic. Headed by M. Bobrzynski , they taught loyalty to Austria and " organic work " to develop Polish culture. The Warsaw "Positivists" preached organic work too, but they did not condemn old Poland and the uprisings out of hand. They stressed the importance of education for the masses and worked for equal rights of women and Jews.

The two most prominent Polish writers of this time were Eliza Orzeszkowa 1841-1910, pron. Ozheshkovah) and Boleslaw Prus (pron. Proos real name: Aleksander Glowacki, 1847-1912). Orzeszkowa came from a middle gentry family and helped insurgents in the uprising of 1863-64. After her husband was deported to Siberia (no great loss because he did nothing aside from hunting and she didn't love him), she lived by her pen. She wrote positivist novels protesting peasant poverty, feudal anachronisms, and the exploitation of women. She also wrote a novel dealing with the education, assimilation, and thus emancipation of a Jew from the constraints of Hasidism ( Meir Ezefowicz, (pron. Yezefovitch) 1878).

Prus came from a poor gentry family and participated in the 1863-64 uprising. His greatest work, the The Doll, was first published in segments in a Warsaw newspaper, 1887-89, and then in 3 vols in 1890. It is a lively and colorful portrait of Warsaw society of the time, highly critical of the life style of contemporary Polish aristocrats, whom he potrayed as living lives of idle luxury and doing nothing for their country. (This was by no means true of all of them). It is considered to be the greatest Polish novel of the 19 th century. (The Doll in available in English, translated by David Walsh).

(a) The National Democrats. In the mid-eighties and early 90s a new generation matured, which set out to work for Polish independence. In 1887, the Polish League was founded in Switzerland by an old revolutionary, Zygmunt Milkowski (1824-1925, pron. Meelkofskee) whose pseudonym was "Teodor Jez" (pron. Yezh). The PL strove for Polish independence. In 1892, it was taken over by Roman Dmowski (pron. Demofskee,1864-1939),who reorganized it as the National League , and then as the National Democratic Party in 1897.

Roman Dmowski's parents were members of the petty gentry who settled in Warsaw. His father became a road paving contractor there. To make more income, he leased two lakes for fishing and sold the fish. He believed that his son would do great things for Poland.

Roman studied biology at the Russian University in Warsaw, and became active in the Assoc. of Polish Youth called "Zet," then in the "Polish League," which as mentioned above, he took over and reorganized as the National Democratic Party. His long-term aim was Polish independence, and he set out to attain it by developing a special concept of Polish national consciousness. He wrote articles and books, teaching the concept of "national egoism" (also a popular idea elsewhere in Europe at the time).

In Dmowski's version, this meant that Poles had to be intolerant of other ethnic groups, especially the Jews. He saw the latter as blocking the development of a Polish middle class. He also pointed out that educated Jews in Russian Poland identified with Russia, with Austria in Austrian Poland, and with Germany in Prussian Poland. He taught loyalty to the Catholic Church, which was to him the hallmark of Polishness. [See: Roman Dmowski, "Thoughts of a Modern Pole," in: Peter F.Sugar, ed., Eastern European Nationalism ,
pp. 205-207].

B. The Socialists. The "Polish Socialist Party Abroad" was founded in in Paris in 1892, while the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) was established in Warsaw in 1893. Its most prominent leader was Jozef Pilsudski ( pron. Peewsoodskee, 1867-1935) . He was born into a Polish landed gentry family in Lithuania, and was at first educated with his siblings at home by his patriotic mother, who taught them Polish history and literature. She also taught them that they must fight for an independent Poland.

Pilsudski hated the Russian High School in Wilno (Vilnius) and barely avoided being thrown out. He spent a year studying medicine in Kharkov (now in Ukraine), but had to leave because of involvement in student protests. He was denied admission to the Medical School, University of Dorpat, because he had been forced to leave Kharkov. Furthermore, his older brother became involved in a plot to assassinate Tsar Alexander III. The Russian "Okhrana" (secret police) discovered the plot and Pilsudski's older brother was arrested along with Jozef, who was quite innocent, but was arrested because he was assumed to be an accomplice. ( Lenin's older brother, Alexander, was also arrested and admitted his participation in the plot he might have been spared but was executed when he refused to plead for mercy).

Jozef was just 20 years old when he was exiled to Siberia, where he stayed in1887-1892. He read a great deal, met older Polish exiles, and became a Socialist. He later said he discovered that Russian Socialists were also Russian Imperialists, so he did not trust them. When released, he returned to Lithuania and in 1893, headed the party there. The PPS aimed at establishing an independent, socialist Poland.
[See: Aims of the Polish Socialist Party, 1892, in K.Olszer, For Your Freedom and Ours, pp.150-151]

Pilsudski began to write and print a paper for the workers, called The Polish Worker , first in Lithuania and then in Lodz, the textile center in Russian Poland. He was arrested with his wife and imprisoned in the Warsaw Citadel. There he feigned madness and, due to a Russian Siberian doctor there, who loved Pilsudski's descriptions of Siberia, he was transferred to a mental hospital in St. Petersburg. He escaped from there dressed in whites with the help of a Polish doctor, and went to Cracow, Galicia. (For continuation see: 1905-1914).

C. The Peasant Party was established in Galicia in 1893, and renamed the Polish Peasant Party in 1903. It stood for peasant rights and a broadening of Galician autonomy. After it split in 1913, the right wing, Piast was led by a self-educated peasant Wincenty Witos (1874-1945), who was to be the Premier of Poland in 1920-21.

D. The Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland was founded in 1894, later adding Lithuania to its name (Polish acronym: SDKPiL). It was "internationalist" in opposing an independent Poland and working for a worldwide socialist revolution. Its most prominent leader was Rosa Luxemburg (1871-1918), who came from a polonized Jewish family in Russian Poland. She was, however, much more active in the German Social Democratic Party than in the SDKPiL, where the real leader was Felix Dzherzhynsky ( Polish: Feliks Dzierzynski, 1877-1926). He also came from a Polish gentry family in Lithuania, but is best known as the first head of the Soviet "Cheka, " or security police in December 1917. (In Dec. 1918, members of the SDPKiL joined with left-wing Polish Socialists to found the Communist Workers' Party of Poland, renamed the Polish Communist Party in 1925).

Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 , and the Russian Revolution of 1905-07 , which also turned into a socialist, anti-Russian revolution in Russian Poland, polarized Polish political thought.

[from Topolski, A History of Poland]

In summer 1904,Pilsudski travelled via W. Europe and U.S. to Japan, where he tried to persuade the Japanese government to subsidize a Polish uprising against Russia so as to divide Russian forces. In Tokyo, he ran into Dmowski, who had gone to Japan from Russia to arrange help for Poles taken prisoner as soldiers in the Russian army - and to oppose any idea of Japanese support for a Polish uprising against Russia. The two leaders had a long talk in a tea house, but could not reach agreement. In any case, Japan won the war and the U.S. President Teddy Roosevelt mediated peace, signed in the Treaty of Portsmouth, Sept. 5, 1905. Nevertheless, Pilsudski did get some money from the Japanese, which he used for intelligence, military training of Polish students abroad, and attacks on selected Russian objectives.

In 1906, Russia became a semi-constitutional monarchy with a parliament. Dmowski decided that the best course for Russian Poles was to cooperate with the Russian government, the ally of France. Indeed, in 1907, England, France and Russia formed the Triple Entente which faced the Triple Alliance of the Central Powers: Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. National Democrats were elected to the Duma (Russian legislature) and Dmowski hoped for gradual concessions in education and self-government in Russian Poland. He made a public offer of Polish cooperation to Russia in his book: Russia and the Polish Question, published in French in 1908. He was also thinking along lines similar to those of Prince Adam J. Czartoryski during the Napoleonic Wars, that is, of uniting all the Polish lands under the Russian crown as the key step to later independence.

Jozef Pilsudski had a radically different program. Not only did he work for a future socialist Poland, but he was also anti-Russian. In 1906, he formed the "Revolutionary Fraction" in the PPS, with the stated goal of fighting for an independent Poland. This broke the party in two: the Revolutionary Fraction on the right, and the "internationalists" on the left. During the Balkan crisis of 1908 between Russia and Austria, he formed the "Riflemen's Association," a sort of ROTC in Austrian Poland. Austrian authorities allowed it to exist in return for Pilsudski's intelligence reports on Russian military objects and preparations.

According to the memoirs of a Russian Russian Social Democrat, Victor M. Chernov, Pilsudski told him in Feb. 1914, when they met at a Socialist congress in Paris, that he would not cooperate with Russian socialists. He said that he foresaw a world war in which the Central Powers would first defeat Russia, and then be defeated themselves by France, Britain, and possibly also the U.S. Therefore, in the first part of the war, the Poles should side with the Central Powers against Russia, and in the second with England, France, and the U.S. against Germany. (See: Waclaw Jedrzejewicz, Pilsudski. A Life for Poland, New York, 1982, pp. 52-53. Jedrzejewicz does not cite any sources, for this popular biography and his book does not have notes, but Chernov's account is to be found in his memoirs: Pered Buriei [Before the Storm] published in the U.S. in the 1950s. There is no confirmation of Pilsudski's statement to Chernov in any other source).

Until the crushing defeats suffered by the Russians in World War I, Dmowski seemed to be right in predicting that Russia would emerge as a victorious power alongside the French and British. Therefore, at first Dmowski had more support among the Poles than Pilsudski.

III. A Brief Note on Polish Culture in the period 1880-1914.

This was a period of great artistic flowering. Many Polish painters studied in France and were much influenced by French Impressionism. However, Jan Matejko (1838-1893, pron. Maateykoh), produced large, historically researched canvasses showing the glory of old Poland, e.g. The Battle of Grunwald, July 1410. One of his students, Jacek Malczewski ( 1854-1929, pron. Yatsek Malchefskee ), at first painted scenes related to Polish history, then turned to half realistic half mythical paintings. Stanislaw Wyspianski (pron. Wehspianskee, 1869-1907) was both a great painter and a playwright. His most famous play is "The Wedding," showing a peasant wedding, interwove the festivities with dreamlike scenes from Polish history. In this play, he hinted very broadly that the Polish intelligentsia of Austrian Poland talked much of an independent Poland, but were too comfortable under Austrian rule to revolt. (This was, indeed, true).

Henryk Sienkiewicz (1846-1916) wrote historical novels about the glorious Polish past. His Teutonic Knights and his trilogy about the eastern wars: With Fire and Sword, The Deluge, and Pan Wolodyjowski, have been perennial favorites with Polish readers, fascinating them in times of peace, and comforting them in times of foreign occupation. Some were translated into a pseudo old - English by the American Jeremiah Curtain in the late 19 th century (who made money on them), but the trilogy has appeared recently in a new, more readable translation by the Polish-American writer W.S. Kuniczak (though he did take some liberties with the text). The best known Sienkiewicz novel in the West is Quo Vadis, set in ancient Rome, where the Christian heroine symbolizes Poland. Sienkiewicz won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1905 .

Wladyslaw Reymont (1867-1925) won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1924 for his great 4 volume novel on Polish peasant life: The Peasants. It is divided into the four seasons of the year and is available in English.

Stefan Zeromski (pron. Zheromskee, 1864-1925), is another great writer of this period. His first novel, Sisyphean Labors, 1898, is a moving, autobiographical account of Polish students, first in a village school where uncomprehending Polish children are taught in Russian, and then in a Russified high school, in which the boys are taught that everything Russian is modern and progressive while everything Polish is outdated and bad. (This was also the program in the Russian High School in Wilno, attended by J. Pilsudski, and a similar line of teaching prevailed in Polish schools in the period 1948-56, this time claiming all things Soviet to be modern and progressive). Thus, the boys were to forget their national identity. However, a student just arrived from Warsaw speaks about great Polish poets, especially Mickiewicz, and awakens in the others a feeling of pride in their nation. We should note that in Russian Poland a Russian High School Certificate was mandatory for acceptance to University studies, or into the Civil Service.

Zeromski's novel The Ashes describes the hero's experience in the Polish Legions under Napoleon, ending with his return, blinded from walking in the snow, to his home in 1812. The Faithful River, deals with the Polish revolt of 1863-64. Before the Spring is a somewhat rambling picture of Polish intelligentsia attitudes at the dawn of independence in 1918.

[from Lukowski and Zawadzki, A Concise History of Poland, (Cambridge, 2001)

The most outstanding Polish scientist of the 19-20th centuries was Marie-Curie Sklodowska, who married a French scientist, Pierre Curie, and became a French citizen. This is a little known but striking photograph was taken in 1913. Her face expreses both determination and suffering. (For biographies, see Bibliography).

For an analytical survey of Polish history during the partitions, see Piotr S. Wandycz (b.1923), The Lands of Partitioned Poland, Seattle, Wash., 1974 (and reprints). The British historian of Poland, Norman Davies (b.1940) takes a more thematic approach in, God's Playground. A History of Poland , vol. II. New York, 1982 (and reprints).

For a study of the National Democratic brand of nationalism, see: Brian A. Porter, When Nationalism Learned to Hate, Oxford, New York, 2000. (Note that the PPS brand of Polish nationalism was democratic and inclusive of all nationalities. Pilsudski dreamed of a Polish-Lithuanian-Belorussian Federation allied with an independent Ukraine).

For a popular biography of Jozef Pilsudski, see: Waclaw Jedrzejewicz, Jozef Pilsudski. A Life for Poland,
New York, 1982 (and reprints).

For a social history approach to the 1905 Revolution in Poland, see: Robert Blobaum, Rewolucja: Russian Poland, 1905-1907 , Ithaca, N.Y., 1995.

For Polish literature, see: Czeslaw Milosz, The History of Polish Literature, London, 1969, and U.S. reprints. Milosz (b.1912) , a poet who was once a communist sympathizer, escaped from Poland in the 1950s and taught Polish Literature for many years at the Berkeley Campus of the University of California. Milosz won the Nobel Prize for Poetry in 1980.

On Polish painting of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, see: Jan Cavanaugh, From the Outside Looking In. Early Modern Polish Art, 1890-1918 Univ. of California Press, 2001.

From 1905 to 1917: revolution and defeat

By 1905, the PSR had become a mass party with cadres in urban centers as well as village committees. After the October Manifesto (1905) and the promulgation of the Fundamental Laws (1906), which promised a parliamentary regime and civil liberties, the PSR voted to boycott elections to the First Duma or Russian parliament. The PSR participated in elections to the Second Duma and collaborated with other socialist parties in the elections to secure victories for revolutionary activists. In 1907 state repression ended the party's temporary renunciation of terror.

Factional conflict plagued the PSR from the onset. On the left the Maximalists adopted economic terror against industrialists and landowners. By 1906 their determination to use bribery, expropriation, and extortion led to their formal expulsion from the PSR. On the right, the People's Socialists left the party during the "days of freedom" (1905–1907) when it became possible to abandon illegal organization. After the legalization of associations in 1906, many revolutionaries remained reluctant to return to underground activity. Before World War I, Chernov had successfully defeated the call by some party members to abandon illegal activity and concentrate agitation in legally recognized associations.

The most dangerous controversy involved the admission of the Central Committee in 1909 that Evno Azef (1869–1918), a prominent figure in the party and a leader of the Fighting Organization, was a police spy. Despite earlier evidence that Azef might be guilty, the Central Committee had refused to investigate and continued to promote Azef into prominent positions. Many in the Central Committee rejected the continuation of terrorist tactics as a result. The Fighting Organization remained ineffective after the scandal despite attempts to revive it.

From 1907 to 1917, the PSR participated in legal and illegal revolutionary activity inside Russia. Cooperation and collaboration with Social Democrats produced a broad-based revolutionary culture before the outbreak of World War I in 1914. Socialists cooperated in a number of legal congresses and conferences called to assemble doctors, women, teachers, leaders of cooperatives, and other professionals inside Russia. These activities contributed to the PSR's popularity among the widest cross section of Russian revolutionary groups—workers, peasants, and the intelligentsia.

During World War I, factions again emerged among most revolutionary groups. Chernov adopted an internationalist stance, while other party leaders became "defensists" and sought to secure Russia against defeat especially after the tsar was overthrown in the February Revolution of 1917. The Provisional Government formed in February was considered to represent the bourgeoisie, while the soviets represented the working masses. After a crisis threatened to topple the Provisional Government, PSR members on the right decided to cooperate with liberals and other moderate socialists. The Left Socialist Revolutionaries rejected cooperation with the Provisional Government and remained with the Bolsheviks in the Soviets. As the war continued, political and economic instability deepened and the Left SRs supported the overthrow of the Provisional Government in October 1917. The SRs held a majority in the Constituent Assembly that met in January 1918. It was dissolved within days by the new Bolshevik-dominated Soviet government. In March 1918 the Left SRs abandoned the government when a separate peace was signed with Germany. During the civil war, many SRs openly opposed the Soviets. After the defeat of opposition forces, many fled into exile abroad while others joined the Soviet government and became members of the Communist Party. The PSR was officially disbanded inside Russia in 1922.

Victor Chernov in 1914 - History

That is not the case with the writings of Trotsky—and I am speaking not of his major works, but even commentary he produced for newspapers. The writings and, I must add, speeches of Leon Trotsky, appear at times to represent history’s first attempt to explain as best as it can what it is doing and attempting. The essential purpose of Trotsky’s greatest political writings—to locate the latest events in the world historical trajectory of socialist revolution—was reflected in the titles he chose: “Through What Stage are We Passing?,” “Where is Britain Going?,” “Whither France?,” “Towards Capitalism or Socialism?” Lunarcharsky once said of Trotsky: He is always aware of his position in history. This was Trotsky’s strength—the source of his political resistance against opportunism and all manner of pressures. Trotsky conceived of Marxism as the “science of perspective.”

A point must be made in this regard: One of the consequences of the destruction of revolutionary cadre by Stalinism and the consequent erosion of Marxism as a theoretical weapon of the emancipatory struggle of the working class has been the celebration of all sorts of people, unconnected with this struggle, as great Marxists: Marxist economists, Marxist philosophers, Marxist aestheticists, etc. Yet, when they have attempted to apply their supposed mastery of the dialectic to political analysis of the events through which they were living, they have proven to be incompetent. Trotsky was the last great representative of a school of Marxist thought—let us call it the classical school—whose mastery of the dialectic revealed itself above all in a capacity to assess a political situation, to advance a political prognosis, to elaborate a strategic orientation.

Reassessing Trotsky

Perhaps the most critical task of the Fourth International throughout its history has been the defense of Trotsky’s historical role against the calumny of the Stalinists. This task involved not simply the defense of an individual but, far more fundamentally, of the entire programmatic heritage of international Marxism and the October Revolution. In defending Trotsky, the Fourth International was upholding historical truth against the monstrous falsification and betrayal of the principles upon which the Bolshevik Revolution was based.

And yet, notwithstanding its intransigent defense of Leon Trotsky, did the Fourth International do full justice to the political and historical legacy of the “Old Man”? There is good reason to believe, now that the century in which Trotsky lived is behind us, that a richer and more profound appreciation of his political legacy and historical stature is now possible. Let us begin this task by subjecting to critical re-examination a well-known passage in which Trotsky assessed his own contribution to the success of the October Revolution of 1917.

In an entry into his Diary dated March 25, 1935, Trotsky wrote: “Had I not been present in 1917 in Petersburg, the October Revolution would still have taken place—on the condition that Lenin was present and in command. If neither Lenin nor I had been present in Petersburg, there would have been no October Revolution: the leadership of the Bolshevik Party would have prevented it from occuring—of this I have not the slightest doubt! If Lenin had not been in Petersburg, I doubt whether I could have managed to overcome the resistance of the Bolshevik leaders. The struggle with ‘Trotskyism’ (i.e., with the proletarian revolution) would have commenced in May, 1917, and the outcome of the revolution would have been in question. But I repeat, granted the presence of Lenin the October Revolution would have been victorious anyway. The same could by and large be said of the Civil War, although in its first period, especially at the time of the fall of Simbirsk and Kazan, Lenin wavered and was beset by doubts. But this was undoubtedly a passing mood which he probably never even admitted to anyone but me. Thus I cannot speak of the ‘indispensability’ of my work, even about the period from 1917 to 1921” [Diary in Exile (New York: Atheneum), p. 46-47].

Is this assessment accurate? In this passage, Trotsky is referring principally to the political struggle within the Bolshevik Party. Quite correctly, he takes as his point of departure the crucial significance of the reorientation of the Bolshevik Party in April 1917. Lenin’s greatest achievement in 1917, upon which the success of the Revolution depended, was overcoming the resistance of Old Bolshevik leaders—particularly Kamanev and Stalin—to a strategic change in the political orientation of the Bolshevik Party.

And yet, the critical importance of this struggle within the Bolshevik Party serves to underscore the far-reaching implications of the earlier disputes within the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party over questions of political perspective. Even if one accepts that Lenin played the critical role in overcoming resistance within the Bolshevik Party to adopting an orientation toward the seizure of power and the establishment of a proletarian dictatorship, he was waging a struggle against those who adhered to the political line that Lenin had heretofore upheld in opposition to the perspective of Leon Trotsky.

When Lenin returned to Russia in April 1917 and repudiated the perspective of the “democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry,” it was widely understood that he was adopting—even if he failed to acknowledge this openly—the political line with which Trotsky had been associated for more than a decade—that of Permanent Revolution.

Trotsky and the theoretical anticipation of October: The Theory of Permanent Revolution

I will review briefly the basic issues that confronted the Russian revolutionary movement in the final decades of the tsarist regime. In its efforts to plot the strategic trajectory of Russian socio-political development, Russian socialist thought advanced three possible and conflicting variants. Plekhanov, the father of Russian Marxism, conceived of Russian social development in terms of a formal logical progression, in which historical stages of development were determined by a given level of economic development. As feudalism was replaced by capitalism, the latter, in turn, when all the required conditions of economic development had been attained, would give way to socialism. The theoretical model with which Plekhanov worked assumed that Russian development would follow the historical pattern of Western Europe’s bourgeois-democratic evolution. There existed no possibility that Russia might move in a socialist direction before the far more advanced countries to its west. Russia, at the turn of the 20th century, Plekhanov maintained, still had before it the task of achieving its bourgeois democratic revolution—by which he meant the overthrow of the tsarist regime and the creation of the political and economic preconditions for a future, distant, social revolution. In all probability, Russia had before it many decades of bourgeois parliamentary development before its economic and social structure could sustain a socialist transformation. This organic conception of Russia’s development constituted the accepted wisdom that prevailed among broad layers of the Russian social-democratic movement during the first years of the 20th century.

The events of 1905—that is, the eruption of the first Russian Revolution—generated serious questions about the viability of Plekhanov’s theoretical model. The most significant aspect of the Russian Revolution was the dominant political role played by the proletariat in the struggle against tsarism. Against the background of general strikes and insurrection, the maneuverings of the political leaders of the Russian bourgeoisie appeared petty and treacherous. No Robespierre or Danton was to be found among the bourgeoisie. The Cadet party (Constitutional Democrats) bore no resemblance to the Jacobins.

Lenin’s analysis went further and deeper than Plekhanov’s. The former accepted that the Russian Revolution was of a bourgeois-democratic character. But such a formal definition did not adequately exhaust the problem of the relation of class forces and balance of power in the revolution. Lenin insisted that the task of the working class was to strive, through its independent organization and efforts, for the most expansive and radical development of the bourgeois democratic revolution—that is, for an utterly uncompromising struggle to demolish all economic, political and social vestiges of tsarist feudalism and thereby create the most favorable conditions for the establishment of a genuinely progressive constitutional-democratic framework for the flowering of the Russian workers’ movement. For Lenin, at the very heart of this democratic revolution was the resolution of the “agrarian question”—by which he meant the destruction of all the economic and juridical remnants of feudalism. The vast landholdings of the nobility constituted an immense barrier to the democratization of Russian life, as well as to the development of a modern capitalist economy.

Lenin’s conception of the bourgeois revolution—in contrast to that of Plekhanov—was not limited by formalistic political prejudices. He approached the bourgeois democratic revolution from, so to speak, within. Rather than beginning with a formal political schema—the absolute necessity of a parliamentary democracy as the unavoidable outcome of the bourgeois revolution—Lenin sought to deduce the political form from the essential and internal social content of the revolution.

Recognizing the immense social tasks implicit in Russia’s impending democratic revolution, Lenin—in contrast to Plekhanov—insisted that their achievement was not possible under the political leadership of the Russian bourgeoisie. The triumph of the bourgeois democratic revolution in Russia was possible only if the working class waged the struggle for democracy independently of and, in fact, in opposition to the bourgeoisie. But due to its numerical weakness, the mass basis of the democratic revolution could not be provided by the working class alone. The Russian proletariat, by advancing an uncompromisingly radical democratic resolution of the agrarian issues, had to mobilize behind it the multi-millioned Russian peasantry.

What then, would be the state form of the regime arising from this revolutionary alliance of the two great popular classes? Lenin proposed that the new regime would be a “democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry.” In effect, the two classes would share state power and jointly preside over the fullest possible realization of the democratic revolution. Lenin offered no specifics as to the precise nature of the power-sharing arrangements that would prevail in such a regime, nor did he define or describe the state forms through which this two-class dictatorship would be exercised.

Notwithstanding the extreme political radicalism of the democratic dictatorship, Lenin insisted that its aim was not the economic reorganization of society along socialist lines. Rather, the revolution would, of necessity, remain, in terms of its economic program, capitalist. Indeed, even in his advocacy of a radical settlement of the land question, Lenin stressed that the nationalization of land—directed against the Russian latifundia—was a bourgeois democratic, rather than socialist measure.

In his polemics, Lenin was unwavering on this critical point. He wrote in 1905: “Marxists are absolutely convinced of the bourgeois character of the Russian revolution. What does this mean? This means that those democratic transformations . which have become indispensable for Russia do not, in and of themselves, signify the undermining of capitalism, the undermining of bourgeois rule, but on the contrary they clear the soil, for the first time and in a real way, for a broad and swift, for a European and not an Asiatic, development of capitalism. They make possible for the first time the rule of the bourgeoisie as a class” [Trotsky, Writings 1939-40, p. 57].

The position of Trotsky differed profoundly from that of the Mensheviks and Lenin. Notwithstanding their different conclusions, both Plekhanov and Lenin based their perspectives on an estimate of the given level of Russian economic development and the existing relations of social forces within the country. But Trotsky’s real point of departure was not the existing economic level of Russia or its internal relation of class forces, but rather the world-historical context within which Russia’s belated democratic revolution was destined to unfold.

Trotsky traced the historical trajectory of the bourgeois revolution—from its classical manifestation in the 18th century, through the vicissitudes of the 19th century, and finally, in the modern context of 1905. He explained how the profound change in historical conditions—especially the development of world economy and the emergence of the international working class—had fundamentally altered the social and political dynamics of the bourgeois democratic revolution. Traditional political equations, based on the conditions that prevailed in the middle of the 19th century, were of little value in the new situation.

Trotsky detected the political limitation of Lenin’s formula. It was politically unrealistic: it did not solve the problem of state power but evaded it. Trotsky did not accept that the Russian proletariat would be able to limit itself to measures of a formally democratic character. The reality of class relations would compel the working class to exercise its political dictatorship against the economic interests of the bourgeoisie. In other words, the struggle of the working class would, of necessity, assume a socialist character. But how was this possible, given the backwardness of Russia—which, considering the limitations of its own economic development—was clearly not ready for socialism?

Looking at the Russian Revolution from within, there did not seem to be any solution to this problem. But examining it from without—that is, looking at the Russian Revolution from the vantage point of both world history and the international development of the capitalist economy—an unexpected solution did present itself. Thus, as early as June 1905, as the first Russian Revolution unfolded, Trotsky noted that “capitalism has converted the whole world into a single economic and political organism.” Trotsky grasped the implications of this profound change in the structure of world economy:

“This immediately gives the events now unfolding an international character, and opens up a wide horizon. The political emancipation of Russia led by the working class will raise that class to a height as yet unknown in history, will transfer to it colossal power and resources, and make it the initiator of the liquidation of world capitalism, for which history has created all the objective conditions” [Permanent Revolution, New Park, p. 240].

Trotsky’s approach represented an astonishing theoretical breakthrough. As Einstein’s relativity theory—another gift of 1905 to mankind—fundamentally and irrevocably altered the conceptual framework within which man viewed the universe and provided a means of tackling problems for which no answers could be found within the straitjacket of classical Newtonian physics, Trotsky’s theory of Permanent Revolution fundamentally shifted the analytical perspective from which revolutionary processes were viewed. Prior to 1905, the development of revolutions was seen as a progression of national events, whose outcome was determined by the logic of its internal socio-economic structure and relations. Trotsky proposed another approach: to understand revolution, in the modern epoch, as essentially a world-historic process of social transition from class society, rooted politically in nation-states, to a classless society developing on the basis of a globally-integrated economy and internationally-unified mankind.

I do not believe that the analogy to Einstein is far-fetched. From an intellectual standpoint, the problems facing revolutionary theorists at the turn of the 20th century were similar to those confronting physicists. Experimental data was accumulating throughout Europe that could not be reconciled with the established formulae of Newtonian classical physics. Matter, at least at the level of sub-atomic particles, was refusing to behave as Mr. Newton had said it should. Einstein’s relativity theory provided the new conceptional framework for understanding the material universe.

In a similar sense, the socialist movement was being confronted with a flood of socio-economic and political data that could not be adequately processed within the existing theoretical framework. The sheer complexity of the modern world economy defied simplistic definitions. The impact of world economic development manifested itself, to a heretofore unprecedented extent, in the contours of each national economy. Within even backward economies there could be found—as a result of international foreign investment—certain highly advanced features. There existed feudalist or semi-feudalist regimes, whose political structures were encrusted with the remnants of the Middle Ages, that presided over a capitalist economy in which heavy industry played a major role. Nor was it unusual to find in countries with a belated capitalist development a bourgeoisie that showed less interest in the success of “its” democratic revolution than the indigenous working class. Such anomalies could not be reconciled with formal strategical precepts whose calculations assumed the existence of social phenomena less riven by internal contradictions.

Trotsky’s great achievement consisted in elaborating a new theoretical structure that was equal to the new social, economic and political complexities. There was nothing utopian in Trotsky’s approach. It represented, rather, a profound insight into the impact of world economy on social and political life. A realistic approach to politics and the elaboration of effective revolutionary strategy was possible only to the extent that socialist parties took as their objective starting point the predominance of the international over the national. This did not simply mean the promotion of international proletarian solidarity. Without understanding its essential objective foundation in world economy, and without making the objective reality of world economy the basis of strategical thought, proletarian internationalism would remain an utopian ideal, essentially unrelated to the program and practice of nationally-based socialist parties.

Proceeding from the reality of world capitalism, and recognizing the objective dependence of Russian events on the international economic and political environment, Trotsky foresaw the inevitability of a socialist development of Russia’s revolution. The Russian working class would be compelled to take power and adopt, to one extent or another, measures of a socialist character. Yet, in proceeding along socialist lines, the working class in Russia would inevitably come up against the limitations of the national environment. How would it find a way out of its dilemma? By linking its fate to the European and world revolution of which its own struggle was, in the final analysis, a manifestation.

This was the insight of a man who, like Einstein, had just reached his 26th birthday. Trotsky’s theory of Permanent Revolution made possible a realistic conception of world revolution. The age of national revolutions had come to an end—or, to put it more precisely, national revolutions could only be understood within the framework of the international socialist revolution.

Trotsky and the Bolsheviks

When one considers the profound implications of Trotsky’s advance one can better appreciate both the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. It is not my intention here to minimize in any way the significance of Lenin’s great achievement, which was to understand more profoundly than anyone else the political significance of the struggle against political opportunism in the revolutionary movement and to extend that struggle to every level of party work and organization. And yet, as crucial and critical as questions of revolutionary organization are, the experience of the 20th century has taught the working class, or should teach the working class, that even the firmest organization, unless directed by a correct revolutionary perspective, can and will become, in the final analysis, an obstacle to revolution.

For Trotsky, what determined his attitude to all tendencies within the Russian social democratic labor movement was their perspective, their program. To what extent was their political program based on a correct assessment of the world forces that would determine the evolution and fate of the Russian Revolution? Trotsky, from this standpoint, was justifiably critical of the program and orientation of the Bolshevik party. Let me read from an article he wrote in 1909 in which he surveyed the different positions held by the varying factions in the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party.

He wrote: “Lenin believes that the contradictions between the proletariat’s class interests and objective conditions will be resolved by the proletariat imposing a political limitation upon itself and that this self-limitation will be the result of the proletariat’s theoretical awareness that the revolution in which it is playing a leading role is a bourgeois revolution. Lenin transfers the objective contradiction into the proletariat’s consciousness and resolves it by means of a class asceticism, which is rooted not in religious faith but in a so-called scientific schema. It is enough to see this intellectual construct clearly, to realize how hopelessly idealistic it is.

“The snag is that the Bolsheviks visualize the class struggle of the proletariat only until the moment of the revolution and its triumph, after which they see it temporarily dissolved in the democratic coalition, reappearing in its pure form, this time as a direct struggle for socialism only after the definitive establishment of a republican system. Whereas the Mensheviks, proceeding from the abstract notion that our revolution is a bourgeois revolution, arrive at the idea that the proletariat must adapt all its tactics to the behavior of the liberal bourgeoisie, in order to ensure the transfer of state power to the bourgeoisie, the Bolsheviks proceed from an equally abstract notion, democratic dictatorship not socialist dictatorship and arrive at the idea of a proletariat in possession of state power imposing a bourgeois democratic limitation upon itself. It is true that the difference between them in this matter is very considerable. While the anti-revolutionary aspects of Menshevism have already become apparent, those of the Bolsheviks are likely to become a serious threat only in the event of victory” [Our Differences].

This was an astonishingly prescient insight into what was actually to occur in the Russian Revolution. Once the Tsarist regime was overthrown, the limitations of Lenin’s perspective of the democratic dictatorship became immediately clear. Trotsky went on to say that the Russian working class would be forced to take power and “will be confronted with the objective problems of socialism, but the solution of these problems will, at a certain stage, be prevented by the country’s economic backwardness. There is no way out from this contradiction from the framework of a national revolution.” So Trotsky clearly identified that the limitations of Lenin’s perspective were not merely in its political calculations, but that those political calculations proceeded from a national, rather than an international appreciation of the framework in which the Russian Revolution would unfold.

He wrote, in 1909: “The workers’ government will be faced with the task of uniting its forces with those of the socialist proletariat of Western Europe. Only in this way will its temporary revolutionary hegemony become the prologue to a socialist dictatorship. Thus permanent revolution will become, for the Russian proletariat, a matter of class self-preservation. If the workers’ party cannot show sufficient initiative for aggressive revolutionary tactics, if it limits itself to the frugal diet of a dictatorship that is merely national and merely democratic, the united reactionary forces of Europe will waste no time in making it clear that a working class, if it happens to be in power, must throw the whole of its strength into the struggle for socialist revolution.”

This was really the central question. The political evaluation of the form of state power flowed, in the final analysis, from the differing appraisals of the significance of the international as the determining factor in the political outcome of the revolutionary movement. The following point must be made in assessing the development of the Bolshevik Party. Every program ultimately reflects the influence and interests of social forces. In countries with a belated bourgeois development, in which the bourgeoisie is incapable of defending consistently the national and democratic tasks of the revolution, we know that elements of those tasks pose themselves to the working class. The working class is obliged to adopt and take up those democratic and national demands which retain a progressive significance. There have been many occasions in the course of the 20th century in which the socialist movement has been compelled to assume those democratic and national responsibilities and draw into its own ranks elements for whom those tasks are of essential significance—for whom the socialistic and international aspirations of the working class weigh far less heavily. I think it can be said that such a process influenced the development of the Bolshevik Party. Lenin certainly represented, within the framework of the Bolshevik Party, the most consistent opposition to such nationalist and petty bourgeois democratic prejudices. He was aware of their presence and could not ignore them.

I would like to read an article that was written in December 1914 after the outbreak of the First World War.

“Is a sense of national pride alien to us Great Russian class conscious proletarians? Certainly not! We love our language and our country, and we are doing our very utmost to raise her toiling masses (i.e., nine-tenths of her population) to the level of a democratic and socialist consciousness. To us it is most painful to see and feel the outrages, the oppression and humiliation our fair country suffers at the hands of the Tsar’s butchers, the nobles and the capitalists. We take pride in the resistance to these outrages put up from our midst, from the Great Russians in that midst having produced Radishchev, the Decembrists and the revolutionary commoners of the seventies and the Great Russian working class having created, in 1905, a mighty revolutionary party of the masses and the Great Russian peasantry having begun to turn towards democracy and set about overthrowing the clergy and the landed proprietors.

“. We are full of national pride because the Great Russian nation, too, has created a revolutionary class, because it, too, has proved capable of providing mankind with great models of the struggle for freedom and socialism, and not only with great pogroms, rows of gallows, dungeons, great famines and great servility to the priests, tsars, landowners and capitalists.”[2]

Lenin was the author of these lines. It would be unjust to read this article as a political concession by Lenin to Great Russian chauvinism. His entire biography testifies to his unyielding opposition to Great Russian nationalism. Yet the article, an attempt by Lenin to exert a revolutionary influence on these deep-rooted nationalist sentiments among the working masses and to utilize these sentiments for revolutionary ends, reflects the sensitivity he felt, not only towards the strong nationalist sentiments in the working class, but also in segments within his own party. There is a fine line between utilizing nationalist sentiments for revolutionary purposes and adapting revolutionary aims to nationalist sentiments. There is not an exact correspondence between the message that an author intends to convey and how the message is interpreted. There is all but inevitably a degradation in the political quality of the message as it makes its way across an ever broader audience. What Lenin had intended to be as a tribute to the revolutionary traditions of the great Russian working class was, in all likelihood, interpreted by the more backward sections of party workers as an elevation of the revolutionary capacities of Great Russians. Notwithstanding its left form, this too is a form of chauvinism with politically dangerous implications, as Trotsky pointed out in 1915.

He wrote: “To approach the prospects of a social revolution within national boundaries is to fall victim to the same national narrowness which constitutes the substance of social patriotism. In general, it should not be forgotten that in social patriotism there is, alongside the most vulgar reformism, a national revolutionary Messianism which deems that its own national state, whether because of its industrial level or because of its democratic form and revolutionary conquests, is called upon to lead humanity towards socialism or towards democracy. If the victorious revolution were really conceivable within the boundaries of a single, more developed nation, this Messianism, together with the program of national defense, would have some relative historical justification. But as a matter of fact this is inconceivable. To fight for the preservation of a national basis of revolution by such methods has undermined the revolution itself, which can begin on a national basis but which cannot be completed on that basis under the present economic, military and political interdependence of European states. This was never revealed so forcefully as during the present war.”

It would be worthwhile to consider the conditions under which Lenin himself reevaluated his political perspective. No doubt his study of world economy under the impact of the First World War gave him a deeper insight into the dynamics of the Russian Revolution and led him to adopt, in essence, the perspective that had been associated with Trotsky for so many years.

When Lenin read his April Theses, it was immediately understood by those in the hall that he was in fact arguing very much along the lines that Trotsky had argued. The charge of “Trotskyism” was immediately raised and, in this very fact, we can understand the enormity of Trotsky’s intellectual contribution to the success of the revolution that year. Trotsky had already provided an intellectual and political framework within which the debate inside the Bolshevik Party could go forward. It did not come as a complete bolt from the blue. If Lenin’s personality and his unchallenged stature within the Bolshevik Party made possible a relatively rapid victory of the new perspective, it must also be the case that Trotsky’s pioneering of those conceptions facilitated the struggle which Lenin waged, particularly under conditions where the masses in Russia in 1917 were moving to the left.

In a certain sense, what occurred in the Spring, Summer and Autumn of 1917 was a deeper and more profound expression of political developments that had occurred 12 years before. I would like to read an interesting passage from the book called The Origins of Bolshevism by the Menshevik Theodore Dan. He makes the following observation about 1905:

“The background of the Days of Liberty [the climax of the 1905 revolution] was such as we have seen that practically speaking both Mensheviks and Bolsheviks were pushed towards Trotskyism. For a short time Trotskyism, which at that time, to be sure, still lacked the name, for the first and last time in the history of the Russian social democracy became its unifying platform.”

That is to say, under conditions of the most explosive movement of the Russian working class to the left, the perspective of Trotsky acquired immense prestige and stature. This occurred in 1905, it repeated itself at an even more explosive, powerful and history-making form in 1917. The triumph of 1917 was a triumph, to a great extent, of Trotsky’s perspective of Permanent Revolution. What occurred in 1922 and 1923, that is the beginning of the political reaction against the October Revolution and the resurgence of Russian nationalism within the Bolshevik Party, created the best conditions for the recrudescence of the old anti-Trotskyist tendencies within the Bolshevik Party. It is not possible to treat the tendencies of that time as if they were unrelated to the political divisions that had existed within the Bolshevik Party. This does not mean that they were precisely the same.

The social tendencies that began to predominate in 1922-23 were very different from those upon which the growth of Bolshevism was based in 1917. The growth of Bolshevism in the revolutionary year was based on an explosive radicalization of the working class in the major urban centers. The social forces which underlay the growth of the party in 1922 and 1923, and which were the source of great concern to Lenin, were to a great extent non-proletarian elements, specifically from the lower middle classes in the urban areas for whom the revolution had opened up innumerable career opportunities, not to mention remnants of the old Tsarist bureaucracy. For such elements, the Russian Revolution was seen, more or less, as a national rather than international event. Lenin began to warn of this, of the growth of a type of national Bolshevism, as early as 1922, and he became increasingly strident in his warnings about the growth of chauvinistic tendencies. As we know, in late 1922 and early 1923 those warnings were directed specifically against Stalin, whom he referred to in his final writings as the individual who expressed the reemergence of the Great Russian chauvinist bully.

The struggle against Trotskyism was, in essence, a reemergence of the political opposition to the theory of Permanent Revolution within the party. What prevented Trotsky from stating this explicitly? I think the answer is to be found in the extraordinarily difficult circumstances created by Lenin’s final illness and his death. Trotsky found it virtually impossible to speak as objectively as I suspect he would have preferred about the differences that had previously separated himself from Lenin. The only passage in which that difference found objective and thoroughly honest expression was in the famous final letter of Joffe, where Joffe told Trotsky that he had often heard Lenin state that on basic questions of perspective it had been Trotsky, rather than himself, who was correct, including on the question of Permanent Revolution.

Trotsky, throughout 1923 and 1924, had sought to inculcate within the cadre of the Bolshevik Party a more critical attitude to the national environment, which he saw as the greatest enemy of the elaboration of a genuinely socialist perspective. There are many passages in Problems of Everyday Life, brilliant articles, in which he revealed the relationship between the backwardness of Russia’s national environment and the great problems confronting the Russian working class in the development of socialist policies and the initiation of the socialization of Russian economic life. Only much later, towards the end of his life, did Trotsky state explicitly that the struggle against Trotskyism in the Soviet Union was rooted in the pre-1917 differences within the Bolshevik Party. He wrote in 1939: “It may be said that the whole of Stalinism, taken on a theoretical plane, grew out of the criticism of the Permanent Revolution as it was formulated in 1905” [Writings 1939-1940, p. 55].

How will Trotsky be remembered? What is his significance in the history of socialism? I think Trotsky will be remembered and will continue to occupy a vast place in the consciousness of the revolutionary movement as the theoretician of world revolution. Of course, he lived longer than Lenin and was faced with new problems. But there is a basic continuity in all of Trotsky’s works from 1905 until his death in 1940. The struggle for the perspective of world revolution is the decisive and essential theme of all his work. All of Lenin is contained in the Russian revolution. But for Trotsky, it was an episode in his life—a very great episode to be sure, but only an episode in the greater drama of world socialist revolution.

Trotsky and classical Marxism

A review of Trotsky’s work in the aftermath of his fall from political power is beyond the scope of a single lecture. But in bringing this lecture to a conclusion, I wish to place emphasis on one critical element of Trotsky’s theoretical legacy—that is, his role as the last great representative of classical Marxism.

In speaking of classical Marxism, we have two fundamental conceptions in mind: first, that the basic revolutionary force in society is the working class and second, that the fundamental task of Marxists is to work indefatigably, theoretically and practically, to establish its political independence. The socialist revolution is the end product of this sustained and uncompromising work. The political independence of the working class is not achieved through clever tactics, but, in the most fundamental sense, through education—first and foremost, of its political vanguard. There exist no shortcuts. As Trotsky frequently warned, the greatest enemy of revolutionary strategy is impatience.

The 20th century witnessed the greatest victories and the most tragic defeats of the working class. The lessons of the past 100 years must be assimilated, and it is only our movement that has begun that task. In history, nothing is wasted and forgotten. The next great upsurge of the international working class—and the international scope of that upsurge is guaranteed by the global integration of capitalist production—will witness the intellectual resurgence of Trotskyism, i.e., classical Marxism.

1. International Trotskyism, p. 32 2 Volume 21, pp. 103-104
2. Volume 21, pp. 103-104

Contents [ edit | edit source ]

Early History[2]Edit [ edit | edit source ]

Reznov was born in Russia, at Saint-Petersburg (renamed Petrograd in 1914 and Leningrad ten years later) and joined the Red Army sometime before World War II. According to Reznov, his father was a musician who, during the Siege of Stalingrad, played music composed by patriotic composers with his violin. His music was a symbol of hope for his fellow countrymen and defiance for the Germans. His father had his throat slit by a German while he slept, one of the many reasons Reznov hates Nazis.

Battle of Stalingrad[3]Edit [ edit | edit source ]

He is first seen in the level Vendetta as a sniper trying to assassinate the German general Heinrich Amsel, the "architect of Stalingrad's misery". As one of the only two survivors of a brutal German massacre at a fountain, he is saved from being executed by feigning death. It is here that he and Dimitri Petrenko first meet each other, with Reznov explaining his situation to Dimitri. Reznov, who can no longer snipe precisely as a marksman due to his injured hand, gives Petrenko his scoped Mosin Nagant rifle, and asks him to eliminate the general. Reznov guides Dimitri on killing a few German soldiers as German bombers fly overhead to shroud out the noise of the gunshots. He leads him through Stalingrad, dueling against a German sniper, and a whole German platoon with multiple soldiers equipped with Flammenwerfer 35s.

Then, they are saved by Petrenko's squad led by Daletski, and continue with them on an assault against a Nazicommunication post. After fierce fighting, Petrenko kills Heinrich Amsel, which gives Reznov a hearty chuckle. They are soon attacked[4]Reznov in Stalingrad. by German Panzers and soldiers. Reznov holds off numerous German soldiers before he jumps in a canal, with Dimitri soon following him. It is important to note that due to Reznov's injured finger he could not fire his rifle with perfect aim, and thus, his "character class" was changed to Submachine Gunner as he wields a PPSh-41 from then on. He is seen without his finger three years later.

Battle of Berlin[5]Edit [ edit | edit source ]

Three years later, on April 18, 1945 in Seelow Heights, Germany, Soviet troops are pushing towards Berlin. Sergeant Reznov along with a new recruit Chernov comes to rescue the captured Dimitri Petrenko from three German soldiers. Reznov often tells the other soldiers to follow Dimitri as an example, especially to Chernov, who seems to be shocked by the vengeful violence of his comrades against Wehrmacht soldiers. The atrocities Reznov and Petrenko saw at Stalingrad made them feel no pity for German troops.

[6]Reznov in the ReichstagIn the level Heart of the Reich, near the Reichstag, Reznov orders Chernov to at least prove he can die for his country, if he can't kill for it, giving him the Russian flag that must be planted on the top of the Reichstag, because Chernov was writing in his diary. Reznov also states that "no one will ever read this." After Chernov had been wounded by a flamethrower, he takes Chernov's diary and states that "someone should read this," contrary to what he had said earlier. Another soldier carries the flag to the top of the roof but is killed before being able to plant it. Reznov then asks Petrenko to take the flag and plant it. When Petrenko gets shot almost fatally with a P-38 by a surviving SS trooper, Reznov jumps in and slices the unfortunate German twice in the torso and impales him in the back. After that, he helps Petrenko up, and tells Petrenko that he can make it, and that he always survives. He then cuts the rope holding the Nazi flag and tells Petrenko to plant the Soviet flag. He expects the two of them to return to their home as "heroes." Reznov mentions many times that the heart of the army cannot be broken as long as Dimitri lives.

After World War II: Project Nova[7]Edit [ edit | edit source ]

Six months after the the Battle of Berlin, Reznov was promoted to the rank of Captain. Reznov continued to serve in the 3rd Shock Army alongside Dimitri Petrenko under the orders of Kravtchenko and Dragovich, despite maintaining animosity with Dragovich for his failure to assist during Stalingrad. Reznov was deployed to Arctic Circle to capture the Nazi scientist Steiner, the mastermind behind Nova-6, a nerve toxin ordered in secret by Hitler to combat the imminent Allied victory. The Russians swept through the remaining SS troops and made contact with Steiner, who was expecting Dragovich. Reznov and Petrenko lead the way into the hold of the frozen vessel, discovering that the Germans were planning on using long-range V2 rockets to send Nova-6 to Allied cities. The group finds and secures Nova-6, but Dragovich orders his troops to restrain Reznov and his soldiers to see the effects of Nova-6 himself. Reznov witnesses Petrenko's horrific death when he and his comrades are gassed. Reznov escapes the same fate by the timely arrival of British commandos also seeking the secret Nazi nerve toxin. Reznov leads his small group of soldiers out of the vessel, killing both British and Russian soldiers in their escape. He manages to arm explosives to sink the ship under the ice.

Reznov was presumably captured and sent to a prison camp in Vorkuta, and had been there for the past 18 years. There, he became a companion to an American prisoner, Alex Mason, gaining his trust and protecting him during their time in the gulag. Because of this bond, Reznov was able to exploit Mason's resistance to Steiner andDragovich's attempt to brainwash him by overriding their original mission with his own personal agenda: killing Dragovich, Kravchenko and Steiner.

Reznov masterminds a massive uprising in the gulag. He and Mason engaged in a mock fist fight to draw the guards' attention. Once Mason eliminated the guard and seized the keys, Reznov led the prisoners to the surface. The Russian prisoners expressed doubt over Mason's trustworthiness, but Reznov convinced them by explaining how they were both "soldiers without an army" and betrayed by their leaders. Reznov continued to lead the insurrection, securing a secret weapon for Mason to blow their way out. He pulled Mason out of a tear gas barrage and the two escaped on motorcycles. Mason managed to escape by leaping onto a train, but Reznov is surrounded by the pursuing soldiers, and is killed.

Mind Game and Legacy[8]Edit [ edit | edit source ]

Years later during the Vietnam War, the SOG was dispatched to Hue City to meet up with a Russian defector carrying an important dossier on Nova-6. To Mason's surprise, the defector turned out to be Reznov. Reznov gave Mason the dossier and revealed that Dragovich and Kravchenko are nearby. Reznov fought alongside Mason, but went missing during the American incursion into Laos. He reappeared after Mason's helicopter crashes, stating that Woods was a good man and that Mason had chosen his friends well. He met up with Mason again inside the Viet Cong tunnels. At this point, Swift turned around and asked what was wrong with Mason, seemingly oblivious to his contact with Reznov. When playing these levels, it is clear that Resnov is part of Mason's imagination since his right index finger, (which he lost in Call of Duty: World at War) is still there.

After Kravchenko's death, Reznov accompanied Mason in his unauthorized assault on Rebirth Island. The two of them fought their way to Steiner, and Reznov proceeded to execute him with a pistol. Mason insisted that it was Reznov who killed Steiner. However, the real events were witnessed by Hudson and Weaver, who saw Mason executing Steiner with a pistol while proclaiming himself to be Viktor Reznov.

During Mason's interrogation, Hudson and Weaver revealed that the real Viktor Reznov had been dead for five years, having been killed in the escape from Vorkuta. Having brainwashed Mason, Reznov was able to complete his personal objective of killing Dragovich, Kravchenko and Steiner leading Mason to become obsessed with pursuing them in spite his other objectives, inadverently continuing Reznov's posthumous legacy. The Reznov witnessed by Mason was a guardian angel-like hallucination, possibly developed by multiple personality disorder.

After Mason finally killed Nikita Dragovich, he heard the voice of Reznov commending him for doing what Reznov himself could not do and for completing his legacy.

The consequences of an errant shell(story only thread)

Emperor Yunghui's Korea had undergone a number of startling changes over the last 8 years, pushing on with the Gwangmu reforms and laying the basis of a modern, industrial society. Korea had state ownership of all of her domestic posts and telegraphs and laying down of railway track had leaped ahead over the last eight years, including a line Pusan-Seoul-Pyongyang-Tonghuan-Darlian-Port Arthur, although this was owned by a Russian company. Russian money had poured into the country to develop infrastructure and with so much growth, that capital had shown great returns for it's investors.

His own domestic military forces, conscious of the threat of Japan, had grown extensively, from 5,000 in 1899 to 28,000 in 1905 to 62,000 currently. Russia had patronized the expansion of the army, delivering 10,000 Mosin–Nagant rifles and over 50,000 of the older Berdens, as well as some older artillery. They had also established a small navy with an old ex Japanese armoured cruiser and 4 torpedo boats.

The countries borders had also expanded. With the fall of the Chinese Empire in February 1912, a number of China's border areas had considered that they were released from their obligations and oaths. Firstly, the Bogd Khan had declared the Independence of Mongolia almost immediately. Tuva had broken away and petitioned to join the Russian Empire at the same time, this being granted 12 March 1913. In the chaos engendered post 1912 fighting had erupted in Manchuria and Russia had moved troops in to reoccupy Manchuria for security reasons.

He had been prompted by his Deputy Minister for Defense Ahn Jung-Geun, who had led the charge to consider occupation of the most strategically important areas that contained Korean majority populations and, after consultations with St Petersburg had duly annexed the three Southern prefectures of Jilin Provence, Yanbian(large Korean majority), Baishan(Korean majority) and Tonghua(Korean minority). This provided a connection through to Darlian, fully owned as it was by Russia from agreements signed prior to 1905. China had so many issues at present that there was little in the way of objection. The population simply desired stability so there had been little in the way of objections domestically when Korea had moved in and occupied the areas in June 1912.

The country was producing it's own steel and was progressing in leaps and bounds, however, he was ever conscious of the Japanese, still smarting from their last defeat, where diplomatic relations were cool, at best.


8 June 1913 H.M Dockyard, Devonport, United Kingdom

Admiral Prince Louis Alexander of Battenberg, First Sea Lord, watched the construction of the ship, now perhaps five months from launch. She would be needed all to soon, he felt. The international situation was going to hell and tensions were as high as he had ever seen them, and not just in the volatile Balkans or in the Far East where the completion of the first Kongo Class battlecruiser, currently only two months away, was sure to embolden Japan.

The tension between the Great Powers was enormous and the naval arms race had embittered relations between Great Britain and Germany. If it came to war it would put him, as both the professional head of the R.N and also as a German prince in a very sticky situation.

The Germans had 17 dreadnoughts and battlecruisers in commission, with seven more dreadnoughts and two more battlecruisers building, but the R.N still had an almost incredible 10 dreadnoughts(2 KGV Class, 4 Iron Duke Class, 4 Queen Elizabeth Class) and three battlecruisers(one modified Lion Class, two Tiger Class) under construction. It was a battle of shipbuilding capability, but the R.N was still prevailing quite handily.


10 June 1913 Westfield, Massachusetts, USA

For Arthur Savage and Savage Arms it was the biggest order as yet received, for fully 10,000 of the new Lewis guns, at $612 per unit, equaling $6.12 million dollars, a staggering amount. His contract specified full delivery within two years to Russia, 4,000 in the first year, balance in the second, so he was going to have to increase the size of his workforce to cope with this order alone. It was a monumental order and task.


1 July 1913 Central Square, Warsaw, Kingdom of Poland

It was perhaps the first time ever in Warsaw that a reigning Russian Tsar(or Tsarina in this case) had ever received a standing ovation when Olga had risen to speak at 11.20pm on the 30 June 1913. She had delivered a speech about moving on from the mistakes of the past and learning from and embracing both countries shared heritage and goals, pledging that Russia would do everything possible to assist the new state in both it's development and security. Her final words, these delivered in Polish "good luck my friends" had produced a standing ovation.

She had been right in one sense. Prime Minister Roman Dmowski had asked that a portion of the Imperial Russian Army stay garrisoned in Poland until the 30 November as a security force and to assist in training the fledgling Polish Army. He had been as emotional as anyone when, at one minute past midnight, the Russian tricolour, as well as the personal standard to the Tsarina, were hauled down and the new Kingdom of Poland's flag was run up the flagpole and saluted.

Elections had been scheduled for early September and the country's army was slowly coming together, the Russians being surprisingly co-operative about releasing Polish personnel from service. Trade contracts had been signed that supplied both coal and zinc to Russia at agreed, at cheaper than normal rates in exchange for military equipment, with 20,000 Nagant rifles and 100 Maxim machine guns to be provided, as well as 60,000 of the older Berden rifles and some older artillery.


12 August 1913 Mogliev Testing Grounds, Mogliev, Russian Empire

The testing had gone well and Colonel Maxim Rosenberg's small infantry gun had passed with flying colours. In the 1912-13 Turkish campaign, the need for a highly mobile artillery system to be used against enemy machine gun emplacements and other strong points had became apparent.

The gun was compact enough to fit into machine gun emplacements. It weighed only about 176 kg and could be dismantled into three pieces - barrel (about 69 kg), carriage (82 kg) and wheels (25 kg), making it easy to move around. To protect the crew from enemy fire, the gun was equipped with a shield 6 mm thick. The weapon was sufficiently accurate at ranges of up to roughly 1.6 km. Contracts had been promised for the 37mm which would greatly assist his own financial situation when royalties were distributed.


20 November 1913, Grand Kremlin Palace, Moscow

Tsar's may have ruled from St Petersburg, but they were made and crowned in Moscow. On the 19th Olga had ridden into the city, accompanied by eight cavalry squadrons, her sister riding with one in her capacity as honorary colonel in the Vosnesensky Hussars, her Uncle at the head of another. She and her entourage had taken time to rest and prepare for the following day's ceremony, while heralds in medieval clothing read out special proclamations to "the good people of our first capital". Receptions were held for foreign diplomats and rulers, the Banner of State was consecrated, and the imperial regalia were brought from the Kremlin armory to the throne hall for the procession to the cathedral. In conjunction with the Tsarina's entry into Moscow, fines were remitted, many prisoners pardoned, and a three-day holiday was proclaimed.

She had been met on the morning of her coronation at the Kremlin's Red Porch, where she took her place beneath a large canopy held by thirty-two Russian generals and admirals, with other officers providing additional support. She had proceeded slowly toward the Cathedral of the Dormition, where her anointing and crowning would take place. Among the items of regalia in the parade were the Sword of State, the Banner of State, the State Seal, the Orb, the Scepter and the Great Imperial Crown. Aide-De-camps, generals of the suite and the Horse Guards troop lined up along the route, from the Red Porch to the Cathedral. The Hof-Marshal, the Hof-Marshal in Chief and the Supreme Marshal, each with a mace in his hand, silently joined the procession, which also boasted the Ministers of the War Office and Imperial Court, the Commander of the Imperial Residence, the Adjutant General of the Day, the orderly Major General of the Suite and the Commander of the Horse Guards regiment, the President and members of the Duma plus others.

She had been met at the cathedral door by the Orthodox prelates, chief among them the Patriarch of Russia. The presiding bishop offered the Cross to her for kissing, while another hierarch sprinkled her with holy water. Once she had had entered the cathedral she had taken her place on the cathedral dais, where a the throne had been set up. Protocol prohibited any crowned sovereign from witnessing the coronation, they would rejoin at the reception.

She had removed the chain of the Order of St. Andrew, and was robed in Purple by the Metropolitan's of St. Petersburg and Kiev. Bowing her head, she now had hands laid on her by the chief celebrant, who had read two prayers over her. These two prayers originated in, and were identical with, those found in the Byzantine coronation ritual. Following this she had directed the Metropolitan to hand her the Imperial Crown. She had then taken the crown from the Metropolitan's hands and placed it upon her own head, almost fighting an urge to throw up with nerves and feeling the massive weight of the heavy crown for the first time.

She had then proceeded under a canopy back to the Red Porch of the Kremlin, where she had rested and prepared for a great ceremonial meal at the Kremlin's Hall of Facets. During her procession back to their Kremlin palace she had stopped on the Red Staircase and bowed three times to the assembled people in the courtyard. Inside the palace, she had greeted representatives of the many Muslim subjects and other non-Christian guests. Protocol had prohibited non-Christians from witnessing entering the cathedral. In another room of the palace stood a group of people in normal clothes these were descendants of people who had saved the lives of Russian rulers at one time or another. After greeting all of these people, she and her sisters had rested for a short while and prepared for the evening's banquet.

The coronation banquet had been held on the evening of her coronation, in the Granovitaya Palata, council chamber of Muscovite rulers. A special table was set for herself and, contrary to normal custom, for both of her older sisters, who dined alone while being served by high-ranking members of the court. Foreign ambassadors had then been admitted one at a time, and she had drank a toast with each in turn, using simply water for so many toasts so as not to become roaring drunk. Foreign rulers and princes were seated in an upper gallery, as only Russians could take part in the banquet itself.

Mindful of the chaos of her own father's coronation, she had scheduled a week in Moscow, both to meet and greet foreign rulers and meet other obligations. Souvenirs had been given away to the populace for up to a week before then event.

For better or worse, the position she had both aspired to and feared the most was now hers.


28 February 1914 Winter Place, St Petersburg, Russian Empire

Michael had retained his place as an "extra" on the Council of Ministers, but now that the Duma had been dissolved, pending elections in March, he planned to spend his time mostly with his wife and 5 month old son.

His last involvements had been working on the change to what would be a new Russian constitution in 1914. The scope of the changes were not great, namely a rewording in Clause 1-3 to remove all reference to the Kingdom of Poland, the addition of three junior members on the State Council, namely Deputy Ministers for the three most important Ministries, Interior, Defense and Foreign Affairs and an introduction of circumstances where the Duma could propose Constitutional changes.

Michael was convinced he had steered the right course, a course between too much too soon and a gradual devolution of powers. It would not be easy for his niece, however, she had spent the last twelve months with the Ministers and himself. She would have a new man to work with, Witte's ill health hastening his retirement and Stolypin taking over as Prime Minister. International tensions, however, were still very high and massive populations transfers had been underway in Thrace and Asia Minor for some time, backed by all to often substantiated allegations of atrocities, although thankfully not in large numbers.

In foreign affairs, he was also convinced he had done the right thing with the Poles. Poland, Korea and Armenia could now act as "trip wires" defensively for any hostile intent towards Russia. In regards the straits,with Bulgaria on one side and the Ottomans on the other, both sides could easily be played against each other if conflict arose. Neither now seemed strong enough to resist Russia if demands were made for Russian ships to exit the straits or for other powers ships to be stopped entering them.

He planned to travel, first to France and then to spend some time in the Crimea. Perhaps then he then could consider another post.


12 April 1914 Tauride Palace, St Petersburg, Russian Empire

Victor Chernov considered both the results of the election for the fourth Duma and his own elevation to the post of Deputy Minister for the Interior. Change was coming, perhaps not as fast as he truly desired, but change was coming none the less. The rich were sharing more of the tax burden, the imperial household leading the way in economy.

Land redistribution had occurred and the land grant offered both in the Far East and Siberia itself had seen much migration to take up land available at nominal amounts of money only. They had gotten rid of the fractious Poles on good terms and had won wars with both Japan and the Ottomans. He hoped to use his new position to further push his agenda of land reform and again push for an increase to the basic wage. He had spent the last three years pushing for a rapprochement between the Trudoviks and the more radical SR elements of the party and finally he had reached an agreement with Vadim Rudnev six months ago and the two parties had rejoined under the Trudovik banner. Rudnev would also serve on the Council of Ministers. The election results had seen a softening in the position of the left parties electorally, even with the extra seat allocation caused by the banning of the Bolsheviks and the vacating of the former Polish Seats. The new Duma consisted of:

Constitutional Democratic Party(Kadets) 162 seats(up 25)
Trudoviks(Laborers) 158 seats(down 8)
Octoberist Party 59 seats(up 10)
Centre Progressive Party(new) 31 seats(up 6)
Russian Social Democratic Labour Party(Mensheviks)(down 3) 27 seats
Union of Landholders 6 seats(down 1)
Monarchist Party (rightest) 6 seats(Up 3)
National Minorities 46 seats(down 29)
Independents 6 seats(down 1)

He considered Savinkov. The man had been pardoned as part of the Coronation celebrations and now needed a home and work that would keep him focused and out of trouble, something he had promised Rudnev he would find for him. He had finally found a position for him as deputy editor of the party newspaper.


2 May 1914 Royal Palace, Erzerum, Kingdom of Armenia

King Tariel(Stepan) Loris-Melikov of Armenia looked over the final figures, approximate but none the less fairly accurate. The huge scale of the population transfers had mitigated to some extent the process of trying to put in place settled institutions such as a national bank, defense force and national currency plus hold a parliamentary election and the like. With the population transfers now finished, it was a matter of pushing on with elections, scheduled for late July and continuing with reforms in the meantime. The country's population, just like Bulgaria's in Thrace had changed greatly. In Thrace and to a much smaller extent in the Balkans just over 700,000 ethic Turks had moved back to Anatolia. Other national groups had flooded into the area, fearful of a backlash from the Ottomans considering the results of the war. Constantinople was now in the curious situation of being a split city, the East under Ottoman rule, the West being now a Greek majority city under Bulgarian rule.

His own Kingdom's demographics had also changed, with huge numbers of Armenians arriving, and now consisted of(old figures in red):

Armenians 975,000 1,885,000
Kurds 520,000 495,000
Turks 435,000 85,000
Greeks 280,000 290,000
Azerbijani 275,000 270,000
Lazes 135,000 130,000
Russians 45,000 40,000
Jews 9,000 10,000


Royal Palace, Erzerum, Kingdom of Armenia


15 September 2014 121 Blake Rd, Annapolis, Maryland, USA

Midshipman Dyson Wallace was putting the finishing touches on his assignment. He scanned the book again, reading "The growing antagonism between Germany and Russia had escalated dramatically during the Balkan League War. The creation of an independent Poland was viewed with abhorrence by both Germany and the Dual Monarchy. The placement by the Germans of one of their own officers(Liman von Sanders) in operational control of the Ottoman Army was viewed as a hostile act by Russia and these hostilities dominated European diplomacy during the spring of 1914. Both sought to improve their diplomatic position, but there were basic differences of aim. Russia wanted to create an alliance with Great Britain and France so powerful Germany would shrink from war the Germans wanted to challenge Russia before the opposing alliance was consolidated and whilst they imagined they still held a military lead, bolstered by a huge military expenditure increases in the last four years, as shown by the table below(military expenditure in millions of pounds):

Country Army Expenditure Navy Expenditure % total GDP
Germany 88.4 22.4 4.6
Austro-H 28.6 7.6 6.2
France 39.4 18.0 4.8
UK 29.4 47.4 3.4
Italy 18.4 9.8 3.5
Russia 72.8 15.6 6.2

In the U.K, although the officials in the foreign office advocated a formal alliance with Russia, British Foreign Minister Grey would have none of it. He sheltered behind public opinion, knowing any alliance with Russia would split the Liberal Government despite more democratic changes in Russia. The policy of keeping a free hand represented Grey's own outlook. He wished to be on good terms with Russia and he would undoubtedly support France if attacked by Germany. He could not understand the alliance as a security for peace like most Englishmen of the era he regarded all alliances as a commitment to war. Besides, he was still scared of Russia's interests in the near East-perhaps it would be better if Russia and Germany fought it out and exhausted one another was his main thought.

An election was now approaching in the U.K and Lloyd George was possibly planning to fight it as the leader of a radical-labour coalition. Resistance to Russia in Persia and a rapprochement with Germany would be part of his platform. In France, opinion was also changing. April's election had returned a majority against the three year national service and in June Poincare was to appoint a left wing government under Viviani, much against his will. It seemed a coalition against Russia was on the cards.

German Chancellor von Bethmann wrote 'Whether a European war come depends solely on the attitudes of Germany and England to each other'. Nor had the Germans any illusions about Austro-Hungary, their own ambassador writing 'How often do I consider whether it is really worthwhile to unite ourselves so closely to this state which is cracking at every joint and continue to drag her along'. The Germans could have escaped this task by reaching out to French and British pacifism but an alliance for peace was not to their taste. They were bent on going forward in the world and Austro-Hungary was essential for them to project power into the near East. The Austrian ambassador summed it up as 'either the abandonment of Germany's aspirations in the Near East or marching on our side through thick and thin'. As so often happens, Germany's ambitions made her the captive of the weaker power.

To both powers, Romania seemed to hold the key to the Balkans. If she was loyal to her alliance of 1883 she could force Serbia onto the same course. This policy was antiquated. Romania had once sought security against Russia, now as a great wheat producing country she had common interests with Russia at the straits. Even more decisive, her national aspirations had been stirred by the Balkan League war. Unlike others, these could not be achieved against the Ottomans. They could only truly succeed by liberating the 2 million Transylvanian Rumanians held inside Hungary's borders. This was a much more dangerous challenge to the Dual Monarchy than any South Slav state, which could possibly have been able to be set up under Francis Ferdinand. However, the rulers of Hungary would never surrender the rich estates of Transylvania. It had been obvious for some time that Serbia was lost to the Central powers, they had not realised that some time ago Romania had become equally lost.

Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov wrote to Empress Olga after a visit to Bucharest 'Romania will go with the side that turns out to be the stronger and offers her the greatest gains'. Neither Olga nor Sazonov had any intention of offering those gains unless war actually broke out. Russia's policy was encirclement and containment. Exactly the same was true of Great Britain. No power of the Triple Entente really wanted a European upheaval, all three would have liked to turn their backs on Europe in favor of prizes in Asia and Africa. Germany, on the other hand, felt she could only expand her overseas empire after a European upheaval and Austria wanted a victorious Balkan war in order to survive at all.

Yet it is wrong to assume that the rigidity of alliances was to make war inevitable. The alliances were all precarious. Italy being the best example-renewing the Triple Alliance yet seeking to negotiate a Mediterranean agreement with the U.K and France on the other hand. In France the left had made the Russian alliance increasingly unpopular. In England the crisis of Irish home rule was reaching it's height. If it was to explode, there would be a radical government - friendly to Germany, or a conservative government so weak as to have no definable foreign policy. In Russia, the conservatives at court, not completely swept away, disliked the estrangement from Germany and could easily have swung on an anti British course with concessions and an offer of a security alliance.

Many Germans knew the ring around them was not solid. Germany lay like a jewel at the center of Europe. She could have used this position to play her neighbors off against each other, as Bismarck had done, however they wished to have continental supremacy. If Germany destroyed France as a power, she could then pursue her imperial rivalries against the UK and Russia with a chance of success. Both powers recognized that and supported France long before Germany's continental ambitions or the expanded German navy had existed. None the less, they would never have been so ready to co-operate with France,let alone each other, if Germany had not challenged them so directly. German policy, or lack of it, made the Triple Entente a reality. The feeble rulers of Germany, Wilhelm II and Chancellor Bethmann, preferred a ring of foreign enemies to problems at home."

Watch the video: Victor Chernov sings at the Bowers